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In this time of global health interventions, preventing borderless diseases, such as Ebola, is a 
question of implementing global health policies in different cultural contexts. Although these 
interventions are mediated by international organs, the healthcare workers on the ground are 
actually those who implement policies. From this starting point, this thesis investigates the extent 
to which Swedish healthcare workers, when combating the Ebola virus disease in West Africa, 
take into consideration the local context in their application of global health preventive measures. 
It does so by exploring healthcare workers’ experiences of navigating global health interventions, 
while negotiating culture. Qualitative semi-structured interviews were conducted with participants 
in the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency’s medical mission, which aimed to combat Ebola in 
Liberia and Sierra Leone. To understand their experiences, Michael Lipsky’s ‘bottom-up’ theory 
and conceptualization of the street-level bureaucrat inspired this study’s theoretical foundation. 
Three themes were prevalent in the interview material: Navigating the field and establishing trust, 
Consolidating objectives and Negotiating culture. This thesis argues that constant flexibility and 
adjustment to the pre-existing challenges in the field are vital in the adaptation of health policies. 
Moreover, flexibility is dependent on the information transferred from the field. Without rapid 
information transferal, bureaucracies and their employees have false perceptions of the field, on 
which they articulate their objectives for partaking in the health interventions. It is further argued 
that these actors continuously have an internal negotiation of ‘Self’ in relation to ‘Other’ and the 
bureaucracy that they work for, while trying to navigate health interventions in a foreign context. 
In conclusion, the ‘one size fits all’ approach does not work and this mindset (re-)produces a 
dichotomy between ‘us’ and ‘them’ where a certain way of doing things is seen as predominant. 
 
Keywords: Borderless diseases; Ebolavirus; Swedish healthcare workers; global health 
interventions; street-level bureaucrat; global health machinery  
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1 Introduction 
In the mid-1990s one single case of an ebolavirus was reported in Côte d’Ivoire; but, following 
that incident, nothing indicated the presence of the disease in the West African region (Feldmann 
2014). Almost two decades later, news spread throughout the world about a terrifying virus with 
the capacity to become global. EBOLA had hit Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone. The outbreak 
exceeded the number of cases and deaths combined in the near forty year long history of the 
disease (WHO 2014e). Thousands of people died in these hardest-hit countries. This borderless 
disease was spreading like a plague, and the question on people’s minds was: When would this 
terrifying virus come knocking on our door and how should we protect ourselves from it?  
8 August 2014, the World Health Organization (hereinafter WHO) declares the situation to 
be a “public health emergency of international concern” (WHO 2014d). As a central figure in 
providing leadership in critical health situations, the WHO coordinated international teams in the 
mission to combat the disease and prevent a continued spread (WHO 2014b:34; WHO 2014i:20). 
Humanitarian aid was sent to the three hardest-hit countries; however, as situation deteriorated 
and the actors present in the region were incapable of combating the disease alone. At this stage, 
the WHO requested Sweden to partake in the mission to combat Ebola. The Swedish Civil 
Contingencies Agency took on this task on behalf of the Swedish government on 20 October 
2014. The initial idea was that the agency together with the Liberian Ministry of Health, operate 
and staff an Ebola treatment unit in Monrovia. Thus, the vast process of recruiting Swedish 
healthcare workers and other non-medical personnel began. However, the local needs were 
continuously changing as the number of cases fluctuated up and down. This required flexibility of 
the agency and its staff in their application of global preventive measures against the disease 
(MSB 2015).   
In our age of global health interventions, combating borderless diseases, such as Ebola, is a 
question of mediating health policies in autonomous states. Although these health policies are 
mediated by international organs, such as the WHO, the healthcare workers working in the field 
are those who are actually implementing the policies. Thus, in this process of ‘bottom-up’ 
implementation of health policies, healthcare worker’s experiences are important to consider as 
these can contribute to assessing the obstacles of disease prevention (Moore and Williamson 
2003:617-8). It becomes even more relevant to illuminate these experiences when the healthcare 
workers move across territorial borders and enter culturally different contexts, as in the case of 
the medical staff working for the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency. Each geographic area has 
its own pre-requisites with regards to resources, culture and so on, which influence the possibility 
for adaptation. Consequently, to transfer health policies on preventive measures should involve a 
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consideration of these local circumstances. Thus, how culture is negotiated in the implementation 
of global health policies impacts the transferability of policy to the unique circumstances of the 
context (cf. Hewlett & Hewlett 2005:292; Holmes, Greene & Stonington 2014:477; Abraham 
2007; Hanefeld 2010:100). With this starting point this thesis pursues the subsequent objective:  
 
1.1 Purpose and research questions  
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the extent to which Swedish healthcare workers, when 
combating the Ebola virus disease in West Africa, take into consideration the local context in 
their application of global health preventive measures. In doing so, the following questions will 
be explored:  
 
 What are Swedish healthcare workers’ experiences of navigating global health 
interventions towards Ebola in the current “hot zone” of West Africa? 
 How do these healthcare workers negotiate their role in this culturally different context? 
 
1.2 Limitations  
This thesis does not evaluate policy implementation per se; rather, it portrays the experiences of 
implementation from a ‘bottom-up’ perspective. Exploring healthcare workers’ experiences of 
navigating health interventions and negotiating culture is highly relevant as research concerning 
this is limited. To pursue this purpose, semi-structured interviews are conducted to grasp these 
experiences. As these experiences portray a snapshot of subjective understandings of a particular 
event, this thesis does not claim generalizability. Moreover, this study mainly focuses on 
healthcare workers that are public employees in Sweden, who work in direct contact with the 
citizens. All interviewees have been deployed in Liberia or Sierra Leone and have participated in 
the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency/Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredskap (hereinafter 
MSB) mission in these countries. Thus, this study is further limited to these countries. 
Additionally, to depict a nuanced picture of the context other participants apart from healthcare 
staff in MSB’s mission have also been interviewed, such as logistic advisors, who have not 
focused on the purely medicinal aspects of the Ebola preventive measures. From a medical 
perspective, they lack direct contact with citizens. Nonetheless, their close collaboration with the 
healthcare personnel make their voices a valuable addition in grappling the work conducted on 
the ground in West Africa.  
 
3 
 
1.3 Terminology  
Before embarking on the background, I would like to present a few notes on terminology. Ebola 
is used to refer to the ebolavirus or the Ebola virus disease (hereinafter EVD). West Africa refers 
to the three countries hardest-hit by the ebolavirus, that is, Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia. 
However, Liberia and Sierra Leone are central for this thesis, as the interviewees were solely 
stationed there. Health workers and healthcare workers are used interchangeably and refer to 
individuals that provide health care in a systematic way to others, such as nurses and doctors.  
The definition of health adopted is that of the World Health Organization (hereafter called 
the WHO), which states that: “[h]ealth is a state of complete physical, mental and social well-
being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity” (1948). This definition has been 
criticized for its generality, because it includes both social well-being and physical health. It is this 
generality, which creates a blurring of lines, where social problems, such as war and crimes, could 
be defined as health problems (Callahan 2012:63-65). Nonetheless, this understanding of health 
lies at the core of the organizations work (see WHO 1948), which includes infection prevention 
and control guidance for Ebola. Thus, this definition is used because of its influence on the EVD 
preventive measures implemented in West Africa by MSB1. 
Global health involves the universal enhancement and equity in health for all people. The 
global aspect is emphasized, as issues affecting health that transcend national boundaries are in 
focus. These issues become global as several countries are affected, which is the case during 
epidemic infectious diseases (e.g. HIV, SARS or Ebola). Health is also affected by transnational 
factors, such as climate change and urbanization (Koplan et al 2009). Global health has been the 
underlying motive for the current Ebola intervention (WHO 2014d). Such global health interventions 
are understood as the mediation of disease preventive measures by third parties in autonomous 
states.  
Finally, the use of acronyms is limited; however, besides the WHO and EVD, the most 
frequently used acronyms are MSB for the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, HIV for Human 
Immunodeficiency Virus, AIDS for Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome and SARS for Severe Acute 
Respiratory Syndrome. The medical terms used are limited to the most relevant, which are explained 
when used in the text.  
 
                                                          
1
 As explained in 2.1 What is Ebola? WHO has a leading role in health emergencies, such as the current EVD 
outbreak. MSB, as a Swedish governmental organization, functions under this leadership in their Ebola mission in 
West Africa. It is therefore assumed that WHO’s notion of health impacts the WHO preventive measures 
implemented by MSB.  
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1.4 Disposition  
This introductory chapter has presented the studied case, the research aim and questions. 
Moreover, it provides the limitations of this study and put forth a terminology section with an 
overview of the most frequently used terms and abbreviations. Thereafter, the second chapter 
presents previous research and situates this study within the presented academic field. The 
subsequent chapter called The case of Ebola in West Africa provides the reader with some 
background information regarding the disease, its trajectory in the region and the prevention 
challenges it presents for these countries. The fourth chapter presents the theoretical framework, 
which is based on Michael Lipsky’s (1980:3) notion of the street-level bureaucrat. It depicts this 
actor as described by Lipsky and goes on to argue that the street-level bureaucrat becomes a 
global actor, who moves across national borders and is embedded in a so-called global health 
machinery. It moreover presents the limitations of Lipsky’s theory. Thereafter, the Methodology 
chapter provides an overview of the material collection process. It is influenced by constructivist 
epistemic relativism2, as it argues that the voices in this thesis are a snapshot of a particular time 
and place of subjective understandings of an experienced reality. The sixth and subsequent 
chapter combines the presentation of the empirical material with a theoretical analysis. It presents 
three main themes found in the interview material; Navigating the field and establishing trust, 
Consolidating objectives and Negotiating culture; and discusses these through a theoretical lens. The last 
chapter provides a concluding discussion, which summarizes and discusses the main findings.   
                                                          
2 Constructivist epistemic relativism refers to the idea that individuals’ knowledge of their reality is subjectively 
constructed and relative to themselves and the context wherein this knowledge is created (cf. Kukla 2000:4).  
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2 Previous research  
This chapter provides an overview of previous research on borderless diseases in the West 
African context. Two borderless diseases are mainly discussed; the Ebola virus disease and HIV. 
These diseases are borderless in nature because their infectious character creates a potential for 
global spread and a difficulty to hinder this mobility (Ritzer 2011:232). As this thesis focuses on 
Ebola in West Africa, research on this topic is primarily discussed. However, there are a limited 
number of studies within social sciences on this topic. Consequently, while navigating the 
academic field research on HIV/AIDS is also depicted to give an understanding of what has 
previously been emphasized with regards to the prevention of borderless diseases. Moreover, by 
highlighting HIV/AIDS research there is also an attempt to illuminate some aspects of the local 
context that other studies argue could impact the application of health policies. Furthermore, as 
this thesis focuses on health workers’ experiences of combating borderless diseases it is relevant 
to portray research in this area. The final paragraph of this chapter situates this thesis within the 
presented academic field.  
 
2.1 The academic field  
Since the first Ebola outbreak 1976 in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC formerly 
Zaire) multiple medical journals have published reports on the subject. However, these reports 
have increased as of last year, which is presumably due to the vast death rate and the regional and 
possible global spread of Ebola. Medical journals, such as The New England Journal of Medicine, 
have presented several discussion articles on the topic that range from the panic and paranoia 
associated with the disease (cf. Gonsalves & Staley 2014) to the global discrepancies in resources 
(cf. Fauci 2014). However, as of yet, a limited number of studies on Ebola have been anchored 
within social sciences and little to nothing has utilized a sociological perspective.  
In academia, the research on Ebola has been relatively limited to the field of medicine. The 
epidemiological aspects of Ebola, such as contamination strategies (cf. Pandey et al 2014); clinical 
documentation inside Ebola centers (cf. Bühler et al 2014) and transmission dynamics (Nishiura 
& Chowell 2014) have been some of the focal points. Despite the predominantly epidemiological 
research focus in this field, some articles also highlight the socio-cultural aspects of Ebola. In for 
example Nishiura’s and Chowell’s (2014) study on the contamination and transmission dynamics 
of Ebola virus disease (EVD) economic and socio-cultural factors are identified to be hampering 
the prevention of EVD. They argue that African regions with insufficient resources not only lack 
a sufficient amount of healthcare workers and other personnel; but, they also lack adequate 
infrastructure and essential medical equipment. Nevertheless, these factors are not the sole 
contributors to an increased spread of EVD. Socio-cultural aspects, such as burials and funeral 
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practices, also intensify the spread and obscure the implementation of preventive measures 
(Ibid.).  
The challenge of disease prevention due to cultural practices has also been emphasized in 
other studies (cf. Pandey et al 2014; Bah et al 2015; Boulton 2014); yet, few studies give attention 
to how local beliefs and practices can contribute to the control measures (Hewlett & Amola 
2003:1246). Hewlett and Amola (2003:1247-8) argue that: 
 
The urgent context of these outbreaks often leads to the neglect of local people’s 
feelings and knowledge. The general impression is that, without Western 
interventions, the epidemic would kill hundreds and spread to all parts of the 
world; local practices and beliefs are perceived only as amplifying the outbreaks. 
 
The significance of understanding local beliefs and practices for disease prevention has been 
emphasized within HIV/AIDS research. In for example Hess and McKinney (2007:113) study it 
is argued that behavior could potentially be encouraged or discouraged to decrease HIV 
transmission if peoples’ behavioral patterns, beliefs and attitudes are identified. Similarly, Moore, 
Kalanzi and Amey (2008) stress the importance of grasping local attitudes. Their study indicates 
that social stigma and discrimination associated with HIV/AIDS impacts HIV-positive 
individuals’ patterns of disclosure. By knowing the attitudes that guide these behavioral patterns 
health policies and the provision of health services could improve (Ibid.:361). However, Green’s 
(1992:121) study emphasizes that it is not only vital to recognize local beliefs and practices, but it 
is essential to incorporate traditional healers for preventing HIV transmission, as people in many 
African societies’ seek traditional rather than biomedical treatment for sexually transmittable 
disease. 
The importance of contextualizing or adopting health programs to local situations has been 
underscored in several studies that have argued that an ‘one size fits all’ approach does not work 
(cf. Hewlett & Hewlett 2005:292; Holmes, Greene & Stonington 2014:477; Abraham 2007; 
Hanefeld 2010:100). Besides the lack of attention in research towards the relationship between 
indigenous cultural practices and disease control efforts, there is also a gap in regards to health 
workers’ experiences of working with disease prevention (cf. Hewlett & Amola 2003:1246; Prince 
& Otieno 2014:929-930). This involves a lack of knowledge with regards to understanding how 
healthcare workers’ experience the process “of navigating global health interventions” (Prince & 
Otieno 2014:929). As health workers’ interact, first-hand, with patients, their experiences can 
contribute to assessing the obstacles of disease prevention (Moore & Williamson 2003:617-8). In 
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a similar vein, Richter et al (2013) emphasize the importance of illuminating healthcare workers 
perspectives. They argue that “[f]rontline nurses are well situated to identify policy gaps during 
the implementation of HIV and AIDS policies and can suggest remedial steps, which can 
contribute to a bottom-up policy approach” (Ibid.:56). The bottom-up policy approach is 
significant to improving the treatment of HIV-positive individuals, as healthcare workers deliver 
healthcare within the policy framework and are affected by these policies in their daily interaction 
and provision of care to patients (Ibid.:53). Clearly, these perspectives are important to study, as 
health workers can both identify policy gaps and can contribute to assessing obstacles of disease 
prevention, and several researchers, such as Turale (2014:443) and Prince and Otieno (2014:929), 
concur.  
The studies conducted on healthcare workers’ experiences in Ebola inflicted areas are 
limited. In Bühler et al’s (2014) study on the lack of clinical documentation in Ebola wards, 
healthcare workers were interviewed to understand and problematize the absence of standardized 
documentation methods. Also conducting interviews, Hewlett and Hewlett (2005) focused on 
local healthcare workers’ general views and experiences of nursing during the Ebola outbreaks in 
Central Africa. The interviewed nurses highlighted three main themes, which describe their 
overall experience of working during an Ebola outbreak: 1) lack of medical equipment, 2) 
stigmatization by community, co-workers and family and 3) commitment to nursing despite 
hazardous working conditions. The two former themes are also reflected in other studies on the 
topic and have been identified as hurdles that impede the Ebola control efforts in Africa (cf. 
Nishiura & Chowell; Pandey et al 2014; Kinsman 2012).  
As previously mentioned, there is a shortage of literature on healthcare workers’ 
“experiences of navigating global health interventions” (Prince & Otieno 2014:929). However, 
one of few studies that illuminate this perspective is the ethnographic study by Prince and Otieno 
(2014) in Kenya. It focuses on healthcare workers perspectives on navigating the juxtaposition of 
donor funded health interventions towards high-profile diseases like HIV/AIDS with public 
health services. The study highlights the uneven work situation that exists between healthcare 
workers in HIV care and health workers in under-resourced public health services. Prince and 
Otieno (2014) emphasize the importance of recognizing the impact global health priorities may 
have on the local healthcare systems and healthcare professionals. By prioritizing and directing 
funds towards high-profile diseases local medicinal issue might be neglected. Consequently, ‘local’ 
medicine comes to be less attractive as professional ambitions are difficult to attain and stress 
leads to a decreased commitment to the work. Although, this thesis does not aim to explore this 
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particular juxtaposition it is important to recognize that global health priorities can impact the 
pre-existing health system and its healthcare professionals.  
Nonetheless, there is some research in the area of global health interventions and policy 
transfer, which focuses on caregivers’ perceptions of HIV/AIDS prevention. Moore and 
Williamson (2003) conducted an interview-based study on this issue in Lomé, Togo, which 
investigated the effect socio-economic, cultural and institutional factors have in HIV/AIDS 
prevention. Based on the perceptions of healthcare workers they concluded that disease 
preventive interventions ought to include an awareness of these structural factors, which are 
contributing components in the spread of HIV/AIDS. In a similar vein, Kevany et al (2012) and 
Ngoasong (2011) stress the importance of modifying global health interventions to the needs of 
the recipient community. Kevany et al (2012) point to the improved efficiency of HIV-related 
interventions when these become adapted to the local setting and socio-cultural environment. 
Evidently, these researchers stress the importance of applying a ‘bottom-up’ approach while 
implementing health policies in different cultural contexts.  
Seemingly, the incorporation of socio-cultural factors in disease prevention is essential; 
however, for disease prevention in West Africa the security aspect is important to consider (cf. 
Rodrick 2006; Ahonsi 2010). Since the late 1980s the region has been engulfed by a security 
crisis, which has not only impacted HIV/AIDS prevention, but disease prevention in generally. 
As pointed out by Rodrick (2006:53-54), this crisis, caused by violent conflict, has exacerbated 
the risk factors associated with potential HIV/AIDS transmission, such as a deteriorated health 
infrastructure, population movements, sexual exploitation and a reduction in scope and quality of 
HIV/AIDS control strategies. As the healthcare system breaks down, the spread of infectious 
diseases (e.g. tuberculosis) increase, while treatable diseases (e.g. malaria) are untreated (Ibid.:59). 
Thus, the regions instable political situation seems to have affected the countries’ capabilities to 
adopt preventive measures against HIV/AIDS. From another perspective, it can be argued that:  
 
[…] emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases remain signiﬁcant obstacles to 
political stability and economic development; if only because in a realist, Hobbesian 
sense, they kill more than conﬂict (Ibid.:53).  
 
Nonetheless, in contrary to Southern and Eastern Africa, the countries along the Mano 
River Basin, i.e. Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea, face the additional challenge of coordinating 
HIV/AIDS health policies that adhere to the regions ethnic and linguistic mixture (Ibid.). 
However, in many African countries, such as Ghana, mass media has had a critical role in 
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transferring knowledge and awareness of HIV/AIDS. Although, Benefo and Takyi (2002:93-94) 
point to a biased knowledge distribution via mass media, as most individuals only adopt one 
protection method, mass media has had the capacity to reach larger parts of the Ghanaian 
population than interpersonal interventions. A conclusion that can be drawn from this study is 
that the role of mass media in disease prevention is important to consider due to its power in 
influencing peoples’ behavior and perception of borderless diseases. As mass media can be used 
by stakeholders to transform individuals’ minds there is an inherent political and power aspect of 
this process that has to be considered. It is a question of power and politics in the sense that 
certain health norms and values transferred via media could become hegemonic or dominant. 
However, based on mass media reports one cannot assess individuals’ internalization of the 
information transferred via media (cf. Benefo & Takyi 2002:78). Although, it would be interesting 
to explore the West African peoples’ internalization of the disease information transferred by 
mass media, this objective would not have been feasible within the frame of this thesis due to the 
study’s current aim, the flight restrictions in the Ebola ‘hot zone’ and high infection risks.   
The previous research on HIV/AIDS prevention presented in this chapter clearly stresses 
the impact local culture and historical events (violent conflicts) have on the prospects of adopting 
preventive measures in the West African region. Additionally, the regions ethnic and linguistic 
mixture illuminates the fluidity of the geographical borders between the countries in the region. It 
can be argued that the fluid borders create a situation where health policies have to recognize the 
hybridity in culture within the West African context to be efficiently implemented (cf. Hewlett & 
Hewlett 2005:292; Holmes, Greene & Stonington 2014:477; Abraham 2007; Hanefeld 2010:100; 
Rodrick 2006). Subsequently, it is questionable if a top-down formulation of policy can be 
mediated without a bottom-up approach, as an ‘one size fits’ all approach for preventing 
borderless diseases will presumably lack awareness of the cultural constellations existing within 
different areas.  
The reviewed literature illuminates the absence of research on health workers’ experiences 
of navigating global health interventions. It further shows an overall lack of attention to health 
workers’ experiences from Ebola inflicted areas. The aforementioned research review also 
portrays the importance of adjusting global health interventions to the local and cultural 
circumstances of recipient communities. With these factors in mind, it seems relevant to portray 
health workers’ experiences of navigating global health interventions towards Ebola. With first-
hand experiences of adopting preventive measures in the current Ebola ‘hot zone’ they could 
contribute to an understanding of the local prerequisites for implementation and illuminate the 
policy gaps. These experiences could give a ‘bottom-up’ portrayal of the situation, which is 
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currently lacking. This kind of understanding is not only important for the EVD, but also for 
other diseases and global health interventions to maximize efforts and results. Moreover, an 
intervention is inherently a mediation of heath ideals in different cultural contexts. Thus, as 
pointed out by several researchers, the ‘one size fits all’ approach does not work when 
implementing global health interventions. This is perhaps especially relevant to consider when 
health interventions are implemented by external actors, as they may not be familiar with the 
context at hand. Thus, it also seems significant to recognize the potential negotiation of different 
cultural understandings of the disease and the implementation of the EVD preventive measures. 
In light of the knowledge gap within the academic field, the importance of health workers’ 
experiences of navigating global health interventions in culturally different contexts cannot be 
overemphasized. Because of this, this thesis aims to investigate the extent to which Swedish 
healthcare workers, when combating the Ebola virus disease in West Africa, take into 
consideration the local context in their application of global health preventive measures.  
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3 The case of Ebola in West Africa 
In this chapter of the thesis some background information is presented. It aims at outlining the 
context wherein the EVD preventive measures are adopted. The initial sub-section focuses on 
explaining Ebola as a virus and its implications on humans. The World Health Organization’s 
role in preventing the Ebola epidemic is also presented here. The following sub-section gives a 
brief overview of the disease trajectory in West Africa. Finally, some of the challenges that 
impede disease prevention are presented. These challenges are divided into three sub-levels – 
macro, meso and micro – to facilitate an overview of the societal factors impacting disease 
prevention.  
 
3.1 What is Ebola?  
The West African population daily faces several deadly, but preventable, disease outbreaks, such 
as Malaria, HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis (cf. WHO 2014a). What distinguishes the Ebola virus 
disease from these is its mysterious and highly fatal character. As of September 2014, the natural 
reservoir, or the original source of infection, is undetermined; but, fruit bats are thought to be 
carriers of the virus. The mortality rate is estimated 
to be between 50-90 percent (Boulton 2014). By 
comparison, the SARS outbreak in 2003 had a death 
rate of approximately 9.6 percent (WHO 2004). At 
present, there is no vaccine or treatment for Ebola. 
Healthcare workers can therefore only treat the 
effects of the disease, such as high fever, diarrhea 
and pain (Boulton 2014; Hewlett & Hewlett 2008:3).  
The first Ebola3 cases were discovered near 
tropical regions in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC formerly Zaire) in 1976 (Peters & LeDuc 1999; Burke, Declerq & Ghysebrechts 
1978:273). During the subsequent years new species of EVD were discovered and identified 
based on geographic origin (Boulton 2014:988). Of these, three Ebola species are transmittable to 
humans; Zaire Ebola virus, Bundibugyo Ebola virus (detected in Uganda) and Sudan Ebola virus 
(Gostin, Lucey & Phelan 2014). Ebola is a filovirus, so called because of its thread-like structure 
(see Figure 1.1) (Boulton 2014:988).  
The virus is zoonotic, i.e. it is transferable between humans and animals, which is 
particularly relevant because ‘bush meat’ is a source of nourishment in some rural areas. In for 
                                                          
3 The virus was named after the river Ebola in DRC (formerly Zaire). 
Figure 1.1: Ebola virus seen under microscope   
Source: Boulton 2014:989 
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Figure 1.2: Ebola outbreak Distribution Map - the “hot 
zone” Source: CDC 2015 
 
example Congo this is thought to have been the origin of the latest Ebola outbreak. Handling 
infected animals or eating undercooked meat becomes a source of transmission. Moreover, the 
traditional burial practices also become an issue since transferal is still possible via dead tissue 
(Boulton 2014; Gostin, Lucey & Phelan 2014:1096). 
If infected by Ebola, a person is incubated4 between two to twenty-one days. During this 
period the virus destroys the white blood cells that are vital for combating infections in the body 
(Hewlett & Hewlett 2008:3-4). The initial symptoms (e.g. high fever, pain and diarrhea) are 
similar to other common tropical diseases, such as malaria and cholera. Due to this similarity, it is 
difficult to diagnose the disease at its early stages (Boulton 2014; WHO 2014a).  
Once an outbreak of Ebola has been confirmed, the following WHO strategies of 
containment are applied (1) resource mobilization and coordination of control and preventive 
actions, (2) establishing surveillance systems for tracing infection cases, (3) adopting behavioral 
intervention programs aimed at reducing social practices that enhance transmission, and (4) 
establishing isolation units adopting nursing precautions. As a central figure in combating Ebola 
the “WHO must coordinate international teams (MSF, Red Cross, GOARN, US CDC, 
UNICEF, etc.) and serve as a focal point for national and international teams” (WHO 2014b:34). 
This is in line with the organizations core functions to provide leadership in critical health 
situations and engage in collaboration with regards to this when needed (WHO 2014i:20) 
 
3.2 The disease trajectory   
In the current West African Ebola outbreak the 
most lethal Ebola species, i.e. the Zaire Ebola 
virus, is sweeping across the region, with an 
epicenter consisting of Sierra Leone, Liberia 
and Guinea (see Figure 1.2) (CDC 2015; WHO 
2014a). Prior to December 2013 no Ebola 
related deaths had been recorded in the region 
(Gostin, Lucey & Phelan 2014). On 23 March 
2014, the WHO made a public notification 
about a Guinean EVD outbreak on its website 
(WHO 2014c). In the months that would 
follow, the disease spread from Guinea, to 
                                                          
4 Incubation period is the time from the moment one is exposed to an infection until one is first showing symptoms 
of it.  
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Liberia and Sierra Leone. The epidemic continued to gain geographic amplitude in West Africa 
and neighboring regions. Consequently, the WHO declared on 8 August 2014 that the situation 
was a “public health emergency of international concern” (WHO 2014d).  
After six months, the Ebola epidemic had exceeded the number of cases and deaths of all 
past outbreaks combined; thereby, becoming the longest and most severe Ebola epidemic in the 
near forty year long history of the disease (WHO 2014e). In contrast to previous outbreaks the 
current outbreak has not been concentrated to rural areas. All capital cities – Conakry, Guinea; 
Monrovia, Liberia and Freetown, Sierra Leone – of the countries at the epicenter of the outbreak 
have experienced vast epidemics. The rapid spread of the virus has shown the inadequacy of 
health responses (Gostin, Lucey & Phelan 2014; WHO 2014e).  
By 10 May 2015 approximately 11 080 EVD deaths had been reported in Guinea, Sierra 
Leone and Liberia. Although there is a decrease and stabilization of EVD cases in total, flare-ups 
remain a risk (WHO 2015). Thus, “[j]ust when the outbreak looks like it is coming under control, 
sudden and unexpected flare-ups occur, again giving the virus a new breath of life” (WHO 
2014e).  
In retrospect, the early reactions from the international community towards the epidemic 
were slow. According to Seth Berkley, chief executive of the Global Alliance for Vaccines and 
Immunization, the increased attention on Ebola was mainly due to the realization that it may not 
stay isolated there. As he puts it: “[i]t’s more about fear of the disease taking hold in the west 
than it is about the disease in the south” (cited in Brooks 2014:32).  
 
3.3 Disease prevention challenges  
On a macro-level, three challenges can be identified; competing health priorities, poor public health 
infrastructure and post-conflict statehood. Firstly, the populations’ health status is weak, as diseases such 
as malaria, HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis are some of the leading causes of mortality (cf. WHO 
2014a). Thus, these competing health priorities strain already weak healthcare systems. Moreover, 
insufficient healthcare facilities become virus amplifier sites due to the lack of strict infection 
control, protective gear and trained personnel, among other things. These factors place 
healthcare workers at greater risk for infection, which ultimately leads to a shortage of human 
resources (Gostin, Lucey & Phelan 2014). In the three hardest-hit countries the response capacity 
diminishes extensively due to the pre-epidemic ratio of 1-2 physicians to 100 000 people (WHO 
2014e). Finally, the countries at the epicenter of the outbreak are emerging from civil conflict, 
which destroyed healthcare systems among other things (WHO 2014a). As a result of the Ebola 
epidemic these fragile economies face greater economic hardships, such as rising prices of goods 
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and services, increased poverty and decreased national revenues (WHO 2014e; World Bank 
Group 2014). 
Three challenges can also be identified on a meso-level; porous borders, communal mistrust and 
traditional medicine. Due to poverty, the populations move across the borders of Guinea, Liberia 
and Sierra Leone to find opportunities elsewhere. Moreover, communities and families live along 
the borders, which increase the movement across. The porosity of the borders creates a situation 
where diseases can be transferred within the region, which makes it more difficult to control the 
spread (WHO 2014a; WHO 2014f).  
Despite the efforts of communicating the risks involved in cultural practices, such as 
traditional burials, there are barriers to controlling these sources of transmission (Gostin, Lucey 
& Phelan 2014:1096). The communal mistrust existing within the West African society towards 
community ‘outsiders’, such as the government, has entailed certain resistance in the adoption of 
the recommended health countermeasures. This has resulted in cases of home-treatment of EVD 
patients, hiding of sick and traditional burials and so on (WHO 2014f). The mistrust in public 
health becomes a barrier to epidemic outbreak control, as trust enables a change in attitudes and 
behavior (WHO 2005:27). This third challenge can be seen as tied to trust. Traditional medicine 
constitutes a source of healthcare for approximately 80% of the population in the developing 
world (WHO 2014g:212). Consequently, traditional healers and medical practices play an 
important role in the contamination of the disease. In the strategy against Ebola it has been 
recommended that such communal figures be included in risk communication because of the 
trust given to them by the communities (WHO 2014h).  
On a micro-level, entrenched poverty, limited access to modern health care and social stigma and fear 
seem to be challenges impeding the control of the outbreak. The region suffers from entrenched 
poverty, which entails that people are unable to meet their basic needs (WHO 2014a). 
Consequently, there is an economic and structural challenge of accessing healthcare due to 
poverty and weak health systems. Moreover, the stigma associated with the disease may 
exacerbate the spread, as uninformed individuals hide sick people so that they are not excluded 
by their communities (Nishiura & Chowell 2014).  
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4 Theoretical framework  
The theoretical framework portrayed below is constructed around Michael Lipsky’s (1980:3) 
notion of the street-level bureaucrat, that is, an actor that provides public services in direct 
interaction with citizens and has relative autonomy in the execution of this work. Usually, street-
level bureaucrats are public employees, such as health workers, that give access to government 
programs. This framework seems suitable in this study as Lipsky’s conceptualization of the street-
level bureaucrat coincides with this thesis focus on health workers and their experiences of 
implementing health policies from a ‘bottom-up’ perspective. Moreover, Lipsky’s understanding 
of the street-level bureaucrat is, in this thesis, framed within a global context, as the services 
provided by the bureaucrats are not confined to national borders. These so-called global public 
services are mitigated within a web of organizations, which connects institutions at national, sub-
national and transnational levels. Consequently, the global street-level bureaucrat is acting within 
a global network when providing global public services in direct interaction with the citizens they 
encounter around the globe. In the following sections, the transformation towards a more global 
role of the street-level bureaucrat is discussed in depth, in the light of ‘the borderless diseases’. 
The first section provides a portrayal of the street-level bureaucrat, as depicted by Lipsky. The 
second section focuses on the interaction between non-governmental and governmental actors 
within the paradigm of global health governance. The third section discusses the role of this 
bureaucrat on a global arena and the final section discusses the limitations of Lipsky’s theory. 
 
4.1 Lipsky’s street-level bureaucrat in action 
 
...the reality of the work of street-level bureaucrats could hardly be farther from the 
bureaucratic ideal of impersonal detachment in decision making. On the contrary, 
in street-level bureaucracies the objects of critical decisions - people - actually change 
as a result of the decisions (Lipsky 1980:9). 
 
The Weberian modern bureaucracy, characterized by impersonal detachment to ensure equality 
(Weber 1968:956-958), has perhaps faded away from the work conducted on the streets. The 
bureaucrats functioning on the ground have a critical role in citizen’s lives because they impact 
their entitlements to public health. Through the direct or indirect provision of public benefits via 
health services, the street-level bureaucrats determine individuals’ eligibility for government 
benefits and sanctions. The policies delivered by bureaucrats are often immediate and personal, 
as decisions are based on individual determinants and made on the spot (Lipsky 1980:3-8). In this 
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process, the street-level bureaucrat is a policymaker based on two related facets of their work: 
“relatively high degree of discretion” and “relative autonomy from organizational authority” (Ibid:13). The 
bureaucrat has freedom of choice (discretion) in the decisions made about citizens in the 
interaction with them. It is expected that professionals, such as doctors, exercise discretionary 
judgements in their field of expertise. For instance, a doctor can determine if a patient is eligible 
for a particular treatment. Consequently, the bureaucrat is quite independent from authority 
when executing discretionary judgement (Ibid.13-25).  
Lipsky (1980:23) argues that: 
 
Street-level bureaucrats enjoy considerable discretion in part because society does 
not want computerized public service and rigid application of standards at the 
expense of responsiveness to the individual situation.  
 
Lipsky’s statement emphasizes the dual role of the bureaucrat that potentially has conflictual 
implications for them. On the one hand, it is expected that the street-level bureaucrat adheres to 
routines and procedures of the bureaucracy, which are assumed to ensure equal treatment of all. 
On the other hand, the bureaucrat should be responsive to unique, individual circumstances. The 
adherence to both increased efficiency and individual circumstances do at times collide. To 
improve efficiency, the bureaucracy reduces people into ‘cases’, which are framed as categorized 
‘clients’. Based on qualifying and disqualifying characteristics the bureaucrat determines if a 
person is eligible for bureaucratic intervention. However, many who work in the world of public 
services value the human aspect of the street-level work and hope to improve the lives of the 
clients they serve. In other words, “[t]hey derive satisfaction from making a difference for some 
clients and resist efforts to reduce the discretion that permits them to have this influence” 
(Ibid.105). Hence, the street-level bureaucrat aspires to provide an ideal level of service; yet, 
obligatory procedural requirements and constrained resources (fiscal and personnel) of the 
agency limit them from attaining this ideal (Ibid.40, 105-106). Consequently, “[t]o deliver street-
level policy through bureaucracy is to embrace a contradiction” (Ibid.71). 
It is usually expected of the bureaucrat to act as an advocate, that is, to utilize their 
position, skills and know-how to secure the best service for the client. However, advocacy is not 
always compatible with the organization or the work environment this agency constitutes. A large 
caseload and mass influx of clients makes it difficult to free enough time to devote to the client. 
Moreover, advocacy is incompatible with the street-level bureaucrat’s job of determining whether 
a client is credible and eligible for the service being offered. For example, is the patient that is 
17 
 
asking for medicine truthful in their description of symptoms? Finally, the agency may in itself 
hinder advocacy. The advocate seeks resource dispersal to clients, while the agency hoards and 
tightly controls the resources. The advocate seeks to secure special treatment for individuals and 
utilizes discretion to gain benefits for clients, while the agency seeks equal treatment of all clients 
so that claims of special treatment do not occur (Ibid.72-74).  
Sometimes street-level bureaucrats feel alienated in their work. Alienation involves the 
workers relationship to their work. For example, a job can be alienating if the worker lacks 
control of the production process of their work, is asked to dehumanize others or has no 
decision-making power over their work (Ibid.75). For the street-level bureaucrat, alienation 
concerns the relationship with the client and becomes evident in at least three instances. Firstly, 
to achieve efficiency and optimal use of resources the bureaucrat does not work with the client as 
a whole. The client is categorized and the bureaucrat is specialized in certain parts of the process, 
which leads to alienation, as the client is not followed throughout the process (Ibid-77-78). In the 
words of Lipsky (1980:78): “[s]treet-level bureaucracies that are oriented towards transforming 
clients are revolving doors because the solutions they offer people are not adequate. […] [The 
bureaucrats] are alienated to the extent they experience this discrepancy as loss of control over 
situations they are supposed to control”. Secondly, the bureaucrat cannot control the ‘reality’ 
outside the agency that contributes to the client’s need of services. Finally, there is an uncertainty 
regarding the number of clients in need of service and the amount of time required per client. 
Thus, the street-level workers have a difficulty controlling the pace of their decision-making 
(Ibid.). Consequently, “[a]lienated work leads to dissatisfaction with the job. Job dissatisfaction 
affects commitment to clients and to the agencies for which they work” (Ibid:79). Hence, as the 
rigid bureaucratic structure alienates the bureaucrat, the bureaucrat comes to be an unsatisfied 
employee, which affects their capability of providing services to the citizens.  
As previously mentioned, the duality of the street-level bureaucrat’s role is contradictory. In 
order to deal with these contradictions, inadequate resources and the influx of cases they develop 
coping mechanisms to deal with the responsibilities at hand (Ibid.18, 71). There can be a tension 
between the bureaucrat’s capabilities and their own and/or the agencies objectives. This tension 
is at times dealt with by physically (quitting) or psychologically withdrawing from the work. 
However, it is also possible that the bureaucrat closes this psychological gap by modifying their 
objectives to better fit personal goals and capacities. Although, specialization can be alienating, it 
is a coping mechanism used to tackle the stressful strains of seeing the client as a whole. By 
compartmentalizing the client and focusing on a specialized area, the bureaucrat perhaps feels 
less stressed and more capable of providing satisfactory services. Moreover, in situations with a 
18 
 
heavy workload the bureaucrat may privately restrict the scope of their authority by for example 
strictly adhering to rules in order to deny discretion (Ibid.142-149). Finally, instead of restricting 
discretion the street-level bureaucrat may opt to increase it “in order to salvage a semblance of 
proper client treatment as they define it” and escape the bureaucratic structures of work that may 
limit this (Ibid.150).  
 
4.2 ‘Borderless diseases’ in an era of global health governance   
Public health services provided by street-level bureaucrats transcend national borders in the wake 
of globalization, here seen as: 
 
…the set of processes involving increasing liquidity and the growing multi-
directional flows of people, objects, places and information as well as the structures 
they encounter and create that are barriers to, or expedite, those flows (Ritzer 2011:2).  
 
Rather than performing in a web of bureaucratic networks within the state territory, the global 
bureaucrat acts across these borders, as borderless diseases have come to threaten public health 
on a global level. These diseases are borderless due to their infectious nature, which creates a 
greater potential for global spread and a difficulty to impede this mobility (Ritzer 2011:232). 
National governments are no longer able to secure the health of their citizens, as health has 
become a global issue. Thus, the public health services offered to the world’s citizens come to 
function within a paradigm of global health governance.   
This paradigmatic shift denotes the transformation of public health decision-making in the 
light of globalization. Public health decision-making is enacted within the framework of global 
governance, where the concept of governance encapsulates an idea of decision-making resting on 
looser non-hierarchical networks of actors participating in policymaking and implementation 
(John 2001:9). Thus, governance refers to “the processes and institutions, both formal and 
informal, that guide and restrain the collective activities of a group” (Keohane and Nye 
2000:202), which transcend the nation. Borderless diseases are not bound to nations and this 
requires collaboration across geographical borders. Public decision-making regarding these issues 
is therefore no longer confined to national borders, as global flows increasingly penetrate these 
structures. Thus, in the context of global health, governance comes to involve the mechanisms 
and means utilized by governmental and non-governmental actors, such as the WHO, National 
Health Ministries and Doctors Without Borders/Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), to regulate, 
control or improve the borderless diseases (Kay and Williams 2009:1-2). 
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Just like the process of public health decision-making changes with globalization, so does 
the street-level bureaucracy. It is no longer confined to national territory; rather, it becomes one 
of many cogs in the global health machinery. This machinery, consisting of formal and informal 
actors, collectively becomes the policymakers and implementers of global health initiatives 
towards borderless diseases. And so, these street-level bureaucracies use the means and tools 
established through governance to guide and restrain actions against these diseases. Ergo, the 
bureaucracy is no longer solely influenced by its national government in its provision of health 
programs, as global health policies or guiding principles for health are reflected in their health 
programs (Kay and Williams 2009:11; Lipsky 1980:3). In other words: “[t]hese influences 
establish the major dimensions of street-level policy [levels of benefits, categories of eligibility, 
nature of rules, regulation and services] and account for the degree of standardization that exists 
in public programs from place to place […]”(Lipsky 1980:14). Thus, so-called ‘glocalization’ take 
place as the merge between the global and the local distinctively differs for diverse geographic 
areas (Ritzer 2011:159).  
The relationship between the global health machinery, the street-level bureaucracy and the 
street-level bureaucrat can be understood as a continuous system of relations, where actors are a 
part of the social context this network creates. As the sociologist Granovetter (1985:487) puts it:  
 
Actors do not behave or decide as atoms outside a social context, nor do they 
adhere slavishly to a script written for them by the particular intersection of social 
categories that they happen to occupy. Their attempts at purposive actions are 
instead embedded in concrete ongoing systems of social relations.  
 
Granovetter emphasizes the interconnectedness that exists between social actors. As embedded 
units in this system, they act in relation to the context it constitutes. Being a system of social 
relations, the global health machinery can be understood as a transaction domain. The concept of 
transaction domain encapsulates an idea of a defined sphere or domain, wherein social exchange 
is collectively agreed upon by the actors interacting in this system. Each domain has a particular 
consensual logic of action (Frödin 2013:72-73). In this light, the global health machinery, 
consisting of actors at transnational, subnational and national levels, becomes a transaction 
domain because this particular social context is collectively defined by the interacting agents. By 
mutually agreeing on definitions of this as a particular situation, specific roles and logics of 
interaction are invoked. Within every transaction domain, each role, such as the street-level 
bureaucracy contra the bureaucrat, is associated with particular deontic powers, that is, 
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obligations, rights and empowerments. When there is domain consensus regarding a particular 
transaction domain, such as the global health machinery, the actors in interaction share an 
understanding of the logics of interaction, specific roles and the deontic power associated with 
these roles (Frödin 2008:69-70; 2013:72-73). It can be argued that the ‘global’ street-level 
bureaucrat departs from this transaction domain, that is, the global health machinery, when 
entering or interacting with other domains to perform their work. For instance, the healthcare 
worker’s logic of action, which functions within their usual transaction domain, is perhaps not 
similar to the logics of action valid or legitimate within the entered new healthcare setting or with 
the logic of action held by the patient one is interacting with. Ultimately, this may lead to a 
collision between different logics of action.  
In the following section the role of the street-level bureaucrat as a global actor is discussed. 
Focus is on the collision of transaction domains that can occur when the street-level bureaucrat 
moves beyond national borders, and enters and interacts with other domains.  
 
4.3 The global street-level bureaucrat 
The street-level bureaucrats of relevance for this thesis have been stationed in West Africa. They 
have moved across national borders and come to interact with clients that exist in another 
context. The street-level bureaucrat has become a global actor. It can be argued that the 
bureaucrat has entered a different transaction domain where the preexisting relationship between 
domestic bureaucrats and clients is not based on the similar premises as the ones they are used to. 
Due to the history of civil war in the region, the governments lack legitimacy, which has 
impacted the communal trust towards outsiders and government officials, such as bureaucrats 
(see 2.4 Disease prevention challenges). Moreover, the weak statehood of the West African countries 
has also resulted in poor health infrastructure. Thus, when entering the context of West Africa, 
these factors become some of the premises for interaction that the ‘global’ street-level bureaucrat 
encounters.  
This thesis argues that to move across transaction domains implies the movement across 
cultures. Culture is a fluent and elusive idea; yet, it is argued that culture is communally shared 
understandings of reality, projected by individuals through their beliefs and practices. People 
draw upon the meaning that culture constitutes to make sense of their reality (Tomlinson 
1999:18-20). In the case of street-level work, cultural influences can be seen as reflected in the 
practices of the bureaucrat. This is illuminated by the sociologist Julius Roth (cited in Lipsky 
1980:85), who argues:  
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There is no evidence that professional training succeeds in creating a universalistic 
moral neutrality... On the contrary, we are on much safer ground to assume that 
those engaged in dispensing professional services (or any other services) will apply 
the evaluations of social worth common to their culture and will modify their 
services with respect to those evaluations… 
 
Hence, each transaction domain is influenced by the particular culture of the context wherein it 
exists, which is reflected in the logics of action in this sphere. Thus, as the bureaucrat moves 
across domains, and into a new context, it becomes a movement across cultures. This means that 
the previous modifications of services applied in one context, may not fit those of a different 
context. Understanding the culture may therefore enable an understanding of the premises 
embedded in the logic of action that exists in the new domain. Culture comes to constitute the 
logic of action and is reproduced in the particular domain, as it is projected through the actions 
and practices of the individuals in the transaction domain. By collectively agreeing upon 
definitions of this particular situation (the transaction domain) specific roles are assigned with 
deontic power. This mutual agreement is based on consensus regarding the logic of action within 
the domain, that is, there is a shared understanding of the set of rules that govern the domain. 
However, through this process of constructing a domain, and assigning roles with deontic power, 
borders of inclusion and exclusion are drawn for this sphere. Not acknowledging the logic of 
action (domain consensus) and lacking knowledge of it, may disable interaction, which excludes 
the actor from this sphere (cf. Frödin 2013:72-73).  
Subsequently, the ‘global’ street-level bureaucrats’ movement across domains seems to 
depend on both their internal negotiation with, and understanding of, the cultural context they 
enter. To be able to intervene successfully in an unfamiliar context, the ‘global’ street-level 
workers’ actions find legitimacy through adopting the locally pre-existing logics of action. By 
coming into contact with other transaction domains, the bureaucrat has to internally negotiate the 
local logics of action with their own inherent logics of action. Through this process, a 
consolidation could occur so that consensus is reached. However, this consolidation would 
perhaps be impossible without knowledge of the culture wherein these logics of action are 
constituted.  
Because the ‘global’ street-level bureaucrat provides services to the citizens in a different 
transaction domain, the legitimacy of the services provided are dependent on the social trust the 
citizens have for the transaction domain that the bureaucrat acts within. As Kenneth Arrow 
(1974:23) puts it: “[t]rust is an important lubricant of a social system,” and so without trust, the 
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system, or in this case the bureaucrat acting within it, is unable to provide services without 
encountering hurdles in the provision of services. Hence, if the transaction domain, wherein the 
bureaucrat acts, is not trusted, then the bureaucrat representing this domain is seen as 
untrustworthy, and vice versa (Gran 2002:420; Farris, Senner and Butterfield 1973:145). Thus, in 
interaction with the citizen the role of the bureaucrat and their provision of services come into 
question.  
 
4.4 Limitations of Lipsky’s theoretical framework 
 
An action that is well adapted to one occasion may be illogical and dangerous in 
another. To appreciate the logic of actions and the rationality that defines them, the 
action must be viewed as a strategy rather than a response; the decision/action 
environment must be viewed as multifarious rather than dualistic; the quandary of 
the street-level bureaucrat must be viewed as emanating from the need strategically 
to assimilate or to balance multifarious competing pressures rather than simply 
involving a need to maximize utilities (Moore 1987: 82). 
 
This quote summarizes one of the main critiques towards Lipsky’s theory. In Lipsky’s attempt to 
construct a general framework to portray the processes within the street-level bureaucracy and 
the actors involved in this domain of public policy, the theory disregards the particularities within 
public service. Consequently, the theory does not differentiate between different street-level 
contexts, such as healthcare, policing, social work and so on, and the different elements of 
decision making processes that are enacted within each of these contexts (Moore 1987:83-84).  
Furthermore, the theory overlooks the need to balance or to combine various competing 
pressures experienced by the bureaucrats in their work (Ibid.:80-81). Lipsky (1980:72-79;105-106) 
argues that the bureaucrats’ ration energy, time and resources to maximize services for the clients. 
Through this decision process stress caused by work overload is reduced. Hence, within the 
theory the decision process emphasizes the benefits of the procedures to maximize services, 
rather than the procedures required to undertaking the job. Moore (1987:84-86, 91) points out 
that the ambiguities that arise while determining the procedures required for preforming tasks, 
are affected by the street-level bureaucrats’ different, but coexisting, frames of reference. By 
defining street-level bureaucrats in more general terms, Lipsky overlooks individual and 
occupational frames of reference that are guiding in decision making processes (Ibid.:84-86,91).  
An additional critique towards Lipsky’s theoretical framework is the lack of attention given 
to professionalism and professional status in public organizations. The bureaucrats’ professional 
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status affects their personal motives and commitments to job, but it also influences the degree of 
discretion that the actor is able to exercise. In the words of Evans (2011:371): “[p]rofessional 
status has an influence on the extent of freedom that an occupational group exercises and entails 
a commitment to values that should inform the use of that discretion”. Evans further argues that 
Lipsky’s theory dismisses the managers as a homogeneous group, whom are dedicated to policy 
implementation. In doing so, the theory does not critically engage in an analysis of their role and 
influence on the provision of public services. Consequently, establishing a problematic 
dichotomy between “policy servants” (the managers) and “policy distorters” (the street-level 
bureaucrats), as the multifaceted role of the managers is overseen (Ibid.:372-373).  
It seems clear that the overall critique towards Lipsky’s theoretical framework concerns its 
generality, as it draws dichotomous lines between managers and workers and disregards the 
particularities within different street-level contexts. In an attempt to tackle this limitation of 
Lipsky’s theory the concepts of culture, transaction domain and domain consensus have been 
integrated in this thesis theoretical framework to emphasize the particularities of different street-
level contexts and to stress that individuals’ have different frames of references. Moreover, to 
take a step away from generality is in line with this thesis objective to not generalize healthcare 
workers subjective understandings of a particular context. Rather the focus of this study is to 
illuminate experienced particularities of a specific street-level context.  
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5 Methodology 
This thesis is a single case study that focuses on one particular phenomenon, that is, street-level 
bureaucrats’ experiences of employing preventive measures against Ebola to combat the disease 
in West Africa (cf. Yin 1984:13-26; Flyvbjerg 2004). All interviewees were deployed by the same 
organization for this Ebola mission, and worked in Liberia and/or Sierra Leone. This study 
centers on this particular Ebola mission and the street-level bureaucrats’ experiences from it. 
Overall, this study aims at gaining contextual understanding of the experiences of street-level 
bureaucrats in relation to the Ebola epidemic, and does not wish to generate generalizable results 
(cf. Flyvbjerg 2004). It is therefore stressed that the experiences portrayed of the situation in 
West Africa only illuminate fractions of a multifaceted context of the disease. In other words, the 
voices in this thesis are a snapshot of a particular time and place of subjective understandings of 
an experienced reality (cf. Kukla 2000:4). In the subsequent sections, the process of navigating 
the field, interviewing and ethical considerations are discussed and explained. These three parts 
are followed by a discussion concerning the research encounter. The final section outlines the 
coding and analysis process.  
 
5.1 Navigating the field  
A ‘net’ was cast in search for potential interviewees with experiences of combating Ebola in West 
Africa. The initial objective was to interview Swedish health workers representing different 
organizations that had intervened in one of the three countries in the Ebola ‘hot zone’. Hence, 
the aim was to portray the more general experiences of adopting preventive measures in the 
region. Three organizations – Doctors without borders (MSF), Red Cross and Swedish Civil 
Contingencies Agency (MSB) – with Ebola missions in West Africa, were contacted in the turn 
of the month January/February 2015. All had deployed Swedish health workers to the region. 
Each agency was contacted via phone, and contact details to human resources managers were 
attained. Ideally, these managers would act as a link between me and potential interviewees. 
However, a setback was faced when the contacted personnel from the Red Cross did not 
respond to any emails or calls and MSF declined involvement in the study. Subsequently, the 
initial objective had to change, which perhaps was for the best. The study came to focus on one 
agency’s mission to fight Ebola in West Africa. Hence, the street-level bureaucrats’ experiences 
would be contextually and organizationally framed in a similar situation enabling a more in-depth 
and thick description of the case (cf. Merriam 1994:24-28).  
Through acquaintances, I came into contact with one of the MSB project managers for the 
Ebola mission in Liberia. The MSB project manager forwarded my request, to come in contact 
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with health workers, to a selected group of MSB delegates. These included both medical and 
non-medical staff that had been deployed to Liberia. The manager created a link between the 
potential interviewees and I. Consequently, this person came to be the gatekeeper to the studied 
field by granting access to a selected group of people. This process could be problematic because 
the gatekeeper is then “indirectly in a position to decide what data are collected” (Eklund 
2010:130). Although, the gatekeeper may lack access to other doors that grant access to 
additional parts of the field. More importantly, without this gatekeeper the field may have not 
been accessed at all. Nonetheless, the encountered interviewees voluntarily suggested other 
potential interviewees, which limited the influence of the gatekeeper’s bias on this study.   
 
5.2 The interview process  
The interviewees of interest were healthcare workers, identified in this thesis as street-level 
bureaucrats within public health, working with Ebola prevention in West Africa. The 
specification of this target-oriented selection was sent out with the interview request (cf. Chein 
1981:440 cited in Merriam 1994:61). All interviewees had participated in MSB’s mission against 
Ebola sometime between September/October 2014 and February/March 2015. They had been 
recruited by MSB for the mission based on their occupational expertise; for the healthcare 
workers this concerned their medical competency.  
Seven out of nine MSB responding delegates chose to partake in the study. Two out of the 
seven were non-medical staff. Although, these did not ‘fit’ the targeted criteria of being 
healthcare workers or street-level bureaucrats5, it seemed relevant to include their experiences due 
to three main reasons. Firstly, these experiences could provide a nuanced and more in-depth 
picture of the context, as the preventive measures do not solely focus on medical aspects. 
Secondly, their close collaboration with the healthcare personnel, make their voices a valuable 
addition in grappling the work conducted on the ground. Finally, there were a limited number of 
health workers (5) that volunteered to the study, despite efforts in contacting additional 
interviewees using contact information passed on by participating interviewees. Thus, to gain a 
deeper understanding of the context their collective (medical and non-medical) experiences are 
seen to create a narrative that describes the situation in the region in the light of Ebola.  
The same interview guide was used (see Appendix II) for all interviews. It was schematized 
into four blocks; background, context, culture and implementation; to keep focus on the thesis 
topic and objective. To enable a storytelling situation, the questions asked were formulated as 
open as possible with introductory words like how and what, and asked for their personal 
                                                          
5
 In direct contact with the citizens the street-level bureaucrat provides public services (Lipsky 1980:3) 
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experiences. The interviewees were initially asked to present themselves and the reasoning and 
motives behind their involvement in the Ebola mission. The following questions concerned their 
negotiation of culture and experiences of the context, wherein their work was situated. The final 
questions involved their experiences of implementing preventive measures towards Ebola. 
During the course of each interview, follow-up questions were asked that focused on further 
elaboration and/or explanation of experiences, opinions and thoughts (cf. Kvale 1996). The 
guide was adjusted and not followed rigorously to enable a conversation-like situation; thereby, 
attaining the criteria for semi-structured interviews (cf. Bryman 2011:412-16).  
I asked the interviewees to choose the site for the interview so that they would feel 
comfortable during the research encounter. All but three interviews were conducted at the offices 
of the interviewees. The remaining interviews were conducted at the home of an interviewee, at a 
café and via Skype. A phone interview (Skype) is perhaps not always optimal as the interviewee’s 
facial expressions and body language cannot be read; however, this was the most feasible option 
since the interviewee was in Africa (cf. Ibid.433). All interviews were conducted in Swedish, 
which is the native language for the majority of the interviewees. Thus, language barriers could be 
minimized and the conversations could flow more easily. With the permission of the 
interviewees, the interviews were recorded and transcribed in Swedish. Only the quotes used in 
the analysis have been translated into English. The shortest interview was 35 minutes, and the 
rest took approximately 60 minutes. Much of the discursive themes provided resurfaced in the 
different interviews.  
 
5.2.1 Ethical considerations  
The topic at hand may not seem particularly sensitive; however, in revealing ones experiences; 
opinions, feelings and viewpoints about EVD prevention and the Ebola mission are put on 
display. To be critical or skeptical towards an organization and its objectives in an Ebola 
intervention can be a sensitive matter because it could result in certain sanctions, such as 
exclusion, for the participating individuals. It was therefore particularly important to keep in 
mind the ethics of interviewing. In doing so, this study adheres to The Swedish Research 
Council’s (2011) guidelines for good research practice.  
Before each interview the interviewee was once again informed of the research aim, 
utilization of the interview material and voluntariness of participation. Furthermore, each 
individual was given the opportunity to ask questions. Thereafter, the option of anonymity was 
presented, and only one interviewee opted for this. As previously mentioned, all interviewees 
allowed for the interview to be tape-recoded. For the interview rendered anonymous, the 
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transcription of the recorded material required careful exclusion of details, which could reveal the 
interviewee’s identity or in any way be traced back to the person. Moreover, the criterion of 
confidentiality has been adhered to, as emphasized by the 2013 World Medical Association 
Declaration of Helsinki, article 24: “Every precaution must be taken to protect the privacy of 
research subjects and the confidentiality of their personal information”. Hence, to protect the 
integrity of all interviewees the recoded material was deleted after transcription, and transcripts 
and additional personal information have been re-coded and stored safely on an external hard 
drive.  
 
5.3 The intersubjective research encounter  
In the intersubjective situation that an interview conversation constitutes, the researcher does 
affect the outcome of the interview through the interaction with the interviewee. As Holstein and 
Gubrium (1995:2) point out:  
 
…all interviews are interactional events. Their narratives may be as truncated as 
forced-choice survey answers or as elaborated as life histories, but, in any case, they 
are constructed in situ, a product of the talk between interview participants.  
 
Consequently, this interaction process constructs knowledge of a phenomenon in collaboration 
with the interviewer (Ibid:3).  
With a point of departure in this idea of the interview encounter, one has to have a critical 
approach towards the information derived through this process, as the researcher’s background 
and preconception of the situation influence the questions asked and the understandings of these. 
Subsequently, with a different background or preconception, the same information would 
perhaps not be accessed. It would therefore not be possible to generate empirical generalizations; 
however, as previously mentioned, this is not the purpose of this thesis. Nonetheless, 
commonality of discourse or similar experiences of a particular situation (e.g. the Ebola mission) 
could imply that the knowledge constructed of a phenomenon during one research encounter 
does not always differ from another encounter. In other words, when the knowledge 
construction of a phenomenon/situation is similar in different interview encounters perhaps this 
implies that the interviewees share a particular understanding of the ‘reality’ of a phenomenon. 
This shared understanding of a phenomenon is perhaps not influenced by the researcher’s 
preconceptions, but rather that the researchers’ biases may impact how much of this reality the 
interviewee choses to reveal (cf. Holstein and Gubrium 1995:2-3; Crang and Cook 2007:15). 
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In the process of mitigating my own position in relation to the interviewee certain aspects 
had to be considered. Being an outsider trying to enter the field can be difficult, as 1) suspicion of 
the studies motives could arise amongst the interviewees, 2) language differs between the interacting parties and 3) 
backgrounds (ethnicity, gender and age) collide. All interviewees had been recruited or volunteered to 
partake in MSB’s Ebola mission. For this thesis I did not in any way represent or collaborate with 
MSB. I believe that the interviewees therefore were not suspicious of the study’s motives and 
because of this they perhaps felt freer to express their opinions. Secondly, without knowledge of 
the interviewees background it would have been difficult to ask relevant questions and 
understand the language used during the encounter. It was therefore relevant to acquire 
information of the biomedical understanding of EVD, including some knowledge of MSB and its 
Ebola mission, before the research encounter. Nonetheless, this did not entail an all-
encompassing knowledge of each interviewee’s background; rather, it facilitated the encounter. 
Finally, my background, mainly my African roots, was of interest for some of the interviewees. It 
became a conversation starter and as such it established a more relaxed research encounters. 
Subconsciously, it was perhaps a topic that unified both parties, as both parties had experiences 
of the African continent, which may have made the interviewees more inclined to share these 
experiences.  
 
5.4 Coding the material  
Initially, the interviews were transcribed in their entirety and notes of interesting themes were 
taken on a separate sheet. During a later stage of the coding, these were revisited to achieve a 
clearer synthesis of the empirics. Certain colloquial language was corrected to increase the 
readability. Only the quotes portrayed in the analysis have been translated into English. In the 
proceeding stage, the transcribed material was printed out and thoroughly read several times in 
relation to the study’s aim and research questions in order to find main themes and patterns. By 
looking for sub-themes, these overarching patterns became refined. The following themes were 
emphasized in the material:  
 
1. Navigating the field and establishing trust  
2. Consolidating objectives: personal and organizational goals  
3. Negotiating culture: local and organizational culture  
 
In coding the material for this thesis there was a continuous negotiation between theory and 
empirics. After the transcription of the empirics, the theoretical section was adjusted so that the 
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theoretical framework would coincide with the empirics. It mostly involved conceptual 
adjustments, which would fill the gap between what had been stated in the interviews and the 
explanatory terms in the theory. Throughout the analysis, the theoretical framework is used as a 
lens to analyze the empirics. Thus, each presented theme is intertwined with an analysis based on 
this framework.  
 
  
30 
 
6 Analysis  
The analysis is divided into three main sections; Navigating the field and establishing trust, Consolidating 
objectives and Negotiating culture. The first section is more descriptive as it emphasizes the MSB 
delegates’ experiences of the field and the process of establishing trust within this context. In the 
subsequent section, the clash and/or consolidation between different objectives, mainly those of 
MSB, the delegates and the local co-workers, are discussed and analyzed. The final section 
focuses on the negotiation of culture that occurred when these actors moved across national 
borders. Using the theoretical lens these experiences are discussed and analyzed to explore 
Swedish healthcare workers’ experiences of navigating global health interventions towards Ebola and how these 
healthcare workers negotiate their role in this culturally different context. All interviewees are presented by 
using fictional names to maintain confidentiality and occupational titles are used to differentiate 
between interviewees with or without a background in healthcare. ‘MSB delegates’ refer to all 
interviewees, regardless of occupational title.   
 
6.1 Navigating the field and establishing trust  
Entering the field, many of the interviewees experienced that everyday life in Liberia seemed to 
continue as usual with a few exceptions, which were already visible on the flight to Monrovia. 
There was a scarcity of passengers on the airplane and the majority of the passengers worked 
with Ebola in one way or another. As a result of a decreasing influx of tourists to Liberia, 
economic consequences where observable, as Dr. August (14 April 2015) states: …there has been 
some tourism there earlier, and that has totally disappeared and they are suffering from it; restaurants and all 
businesses. The interviewee goes on to vividly describe the apparent changes in everyday life: 
 
What struck me right away were all of these external things; when you landed and in town, 
everywhere, there were large posters and placards and [information was] painted on walls and 
houses; how Ebola is transmitted, how to protect oneself and the need to call an ambulance if you 
have symptoms. It was very intense. Ebola, Ebola, Ebola everywhere […]. It was as constant 
reminders; it was otherwise not visible in the city [Monrovia]. Besides that, it looked just like any 
West African city. And then, there was also this thing of not shaking hands, and that was also a 
bit strange. When you meet somebody, it’s so natural that you hold out your hand; it’s no touch 
that applies, and you got used to that after a while. And walking in town there where a lot of 
people, but all kind of went around and made sure that they didn’t touch each other. That was 
very strange. Otherwise, externally, you could not see that much. 
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Dr. August clearly highlights observable changes in culturally normal practices in West African 
societies. The usual way of greeting each other had transformed in the light of the disease. For 
these societies, culture, as communally shared understandings of reality, became different, which 
came to be evident in peoples’ practices (Tomlinson 1999:18-20). In a similar vein, Gustav (27 
March 2015), a security advisor for humanitarian emergency response, stresses the lack of close 
contact amongst people and further states: I would actually say that what I saw was the absence of things 
rather than the presence of Ebola. These observations of the situation in the capital of Liberia, 
Monrovia, did not differ much from the other interviewees’ perceptions of the field in 
Greenville, Liberia and Freetown, Sierra Leone. For many of the interviewees it was perhaps not 
surprising that close human interaction had become absent in lieu of the increased risk awareness 
induced by these governments’ information spread for disease prevention. What came to be 
evident for some interviewees was the absence of death and horror on the streets, which had 
been portrayed by international media in the early stages of the Ebola outbreak. As Fredrik (7 
April 2015), the team leader for logistics puts it:  
 
I was surprised that life was much more normal than I had thought. The preconception or 
information you had, made you believe that there was much more disease then there actually was. 
[…] a horror picture had been painted that wasn’t the reality. 
 
This quote highlights the lack of consolidation between the ‘reality’ perceived on the ground and 
the portrayal of this ‘reality’ projected beyond the confines of the Ebola hot zone. In projecting 
information about ‘reality’ on the ground to the rest of the world, perhaps the lack of 
consolidation between these representations is due to the liquidity of information leaking through 
the barriers of the national confines. In other words, the barriers of the nations, wherein Ebola is 
a reality, may be so impermeable that information slipping through is not liquid enough for it to 
come through in its entirety. Applying the concept of globalization, it is possible to argue that all 
information does not easily flow across barriers, as information has different levels of liquidity and 
the barriers it encounters are similarly non-porous (cf. Ritzer 2011). The projected images of 
Ebola in the country context, in which the MSB delegates were deployed, became a basis for their 
preconceptions and expectations of the field. In this light, it is presumable that this projected 
depiction of the field also came to be the basis for why some of the delegates chose to partake in 
MSB’s mission. In other words, some of the interviewees volunteered to the mission because the 
situation seemed so serious and the Ebola outbreak could potentially spread worldwide. As the 
preconception of the field did not coincide with ‘reality’ on the ground, they questioned their 
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individual motives and reasoning for participating in the mission. On another note, it is worth to 
point out that fear and risk awareness associated with borderless diseases, such as Ebola, created 
a hype concerning a potential global spread, which may be a reason that could explain why this 
perception of horror lingered on.  
Although, life seemed fairly normal on the surface, fear and risk awareness had become 
entrenched parts of the Liberian and Sierra Leonean societies. This was something expressed by 
all interviewees. Nurse Karin (26 March 2015) describes an encounter with communal fear 
towards the disease and its association with the ‘imperial whites’ in the following way: 
 
[…] stories were circulating, and it did that in both countries, [saying] Ebola doesn’t exist; we 
[the white] have come to harvest and sell organs, for example. One man, a survivor told [us] that 
his wife had died from Ebola, so he had become sick and then thought he would go to MoD1 
[Ebola treatment unit in Monrovia]. Then his neighbors said ‘you cannot go there, they will kill 
you there. You will get two yellow pills, and so you will die and they will take all your organs, and 
we will never see you again. That is what happens there.’ […] There where several of these 
prejudices.  
 
Remembering the challenges presented in the background (see 2.3. Disease prevention challenges) it 
can be argued that fear impedes the possibility of implementing preventive measures against 
Ebola in the region. People may not seek healthcare due to rumors that propagate fear and this 
increases the spread of the disease, which was something expressed by all interviewees. Hence, 
going to these Ebola centers to seek help was nothing short of an act of bravery. 
 
If you’re in because of tonsillitis or something else […] and you are in because of that and not 
Ebola, there is a great risk of you contracting Ebola because you’re moving in that environment. 
- Dr. Max, 30 March 2015 
 
I thought that it was incredibly courageous [that people] sought care. Everybody was terrified of 
this center, and everyone knew that people with Ebola were lying there […]. 
- Dr. August, 14 April 2015 
 
Not only are surviving patients exposed to the risk of actually contracting the disease at the 
center, those who are lucky enough to survive, face the risk of stigmatization (WHO 2014a). 
People feared that survivors would bring the disease back to the community. And so, some 
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survivors, but also local healthcare workers, were excluded from their communities, evicted from 
their apartments and even fired from their jobs. For many of the interviewees this behavior was 
based on a lack of knowledge of the disease. The governments of Liberia and Sierra Leone had 
spread information about the disease in the capital areas; however, communication with the rural 
regions seemed to be weaker. News of the Ebola epidemic seemed not to travel fast, as rural 
areas lacked preparedness and awareness of the disease, which two interviewees highlight:  
 
I would say that there was a lack of reporting of what was happening in the counties or in the 
different regions. You didn’t know that much. There were some counties that were really good at 
reporting, and then there were some with a large number of unrecorded cases […] Later when they 
came out to the villages on the countryside, large populations had been infected by Ebola, and a lot 
had died from Ebola. But they [the villagers] didn’t even know that the country had Ebola, and 
at this time the epidemic had been going on for almost 9 months. So communication with the 
countryside was very difficult.  
- Gustav, 27 March 2015 
  
It is so far away from Monrovia, so no one controls it…you can say that they have their own 
rules. […] I got a perception of that it was Greenville, and they had to solve their own things 
down there.  
- Nurse Jacob, 18 March 2015 
 
The two abovementioned quotes indicate the authorities’ inability to reach the distant regions in 
these countries, as communication is insufficient, roads are poor and rule of law does not apply 
everywhere (WHO 2014a). Some peripheral regions seem to have become isolated units 
functioning on their own. This peripheral autonomy sheds light on the government’s incapability 
of penetrating the communities on the countryside. The relative distance between Monrovia and 
the rest of the country is so great that it becomes questionable if the government is able to assert 
and fortify its power, as an authority, in these regions. The relationship between these parties also 
weakens as the population perceives the government as corrupt and untrustworthy. Thus, 
although people actually sought care at these Ebola treatment units (hereinafter ETU), the topic 
of trust was still underlined during all research encounters. The interviewees felt that people were 
skeptical towards authorities and distrusted them mainly due to the ongoing corruption in these 
countries. 
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Absolutely zero trust and a constant complain about corruption.[…] People were very talkative, 
and they might have been that anywhere if you knew the language, but because we knew English 
we could hear all of this. [People also said] ‘We know that a lot has come to this country 
[Liberia], but it doesn’t go to those it should’  
- Dr. Ingrid, 12 April 2015 
  
These three countries; Sierra Leone, Guinea and Liberia; have a very disordered past with great 
distrust to authorities…great distrust. And you didn’t trust at all. Liberia was perhaps the best 
in the context. It was perhaps better in Liberia than in the other two countries that still have a lot 
of [Ebola] cases. You questioned, and didn’t dare to trust. They knew how corrupt everything 
was.  
- Dr. Max, 30 March 2015 
 
Despite the general distrust towards authorities people were still willing to seek healthcare. 
Perhaps the information regarding Ebola prevention had reached the population or perhaps trust 
for the ETU’s was established. Several of the interviewees maintained that the Liberian and Sierra 
Leonean communities had internalized the information concerning the virus since safety 
precautions, such as ‘no-touch’ and basic sanitarian measures (e.g. frequent washing of hands), 
were applied. Furthermore, to increase the legitimacy of the information transferred to the people 
the governments of these countries utilized well-known communal figures, such as heads of 
tribes and football stars, to inform the people. Overall, fellow countrymen seemed to be more 
trustworthy than foreigners. If these countrymen were recognized by the communities, their 
word held greater strength than governmental authorities, which Dr. Max (30 March 2015) 
underlines: It is not possible to come as a white westerner and tell them how to live to not contract it [Ebola]; 
rather, that is something they have to do themselves. Since the well-known communal figures shared the 
local people’s understanding of reality and thus also their practices and beliefs, it is presumable 
that they trusted them more than outsiders. It can be argued that their actions and beliefs found 
legitimacy in the communally shared understanding of reality (cf. Tomlinson 1999:18-29).   
To further gain legitimacy for the Ebola prevention endeavor and encourage people to seek 
treatment, patients who were declared cured were given certificates legitimizing this status. 
According to some of the interviewees, the main argument was that transparency leads to trust. 
Thus, if it could be verified that 1) everyone who enters an ETU does not die, 2) relatives can 
securely visit these units and 3) and if bodies of dead relatives were released; then perhaps 
individuals potentially carrying the disease would seek treatment.  
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Nonetheless, as indirectly pinpointed in Dr. Max’s previous statement, there seemed to be 
both suspicion against ‘the white man’ and an identifiable dichotomy between African/Western, 
black/white, local/external and familiar/foreign. The dichotomy between ‘us’ and ‘them’ creates 
a cultural border, where the foreign aid workers come to belong to another transaction domain 
with a different logic of action. This is further illustrated by the circulating rumors questioning 
the ‘actual’ objectives and endeavors of foreign aid workers. These rumors project an idea of 
reality, which is fortified by the peoples’ beliefs. Consequently, as people believe these rumors, 
they act upon them to tackle and respond to the reality they create (cf. Tomlinson 1999:18-20; 
Frödin 2013:72-73).  
During the MSB mission in Liberia and Sierra Leone, several interviewees elicited that 
suspicion regarding the objectives of their mission was directed towards them by Liberian and 
Sierra Leonean co-workers. The role of the MSB delegates was not always obvious for their local 
co-workers, which Nurse Karin (26 March 2015) explains in relation to her encounters in Sierra 
Leone:  
 
When they understood that we firstly were not British and secondly that we actually would work 
and not just walk around with some protocol checking what they were doing, then everything 
opened.  
 
Dr. Ingrid (12 April 2015) portrays a similar encounter in Greenville: 
 
We often had to explain. I don’t believe that they thought it was obvious that we were there to 
combat Ebola, because I believe, that they rightly thought that they had already been doing this 
themselves. They almost got angry when we said: ‘we are here to combat Ebola’. They said: ‘it 
would have been better if you fixed the generator…it would be better if you made this place into 
what it was before…look there, the lampposts are still there but we don’t have electricity anymore’ 
 
Running into the local population, Nurse Jacob (18 March 2015) says: 
 
It was actually a really small town [Greenville] and we thought that everyone should know why we 
were there.  
 
The quotes indicate that these Swedish healthcare workers were outsiders. Although not uttered, 
skepticism from local co-workers seemed to put the role of the MSB delegates into question and 
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ultimately their individual justification for being there. Thereby, it also seemed as if the legitimacy 
of their intended actions were being questioned.  Some of the interviewees brought forth this 
issue by arguing that they had to assert their role and the objectives of their work to their local 
co-workers. Hence, if the motives of the MSB delegates were deemed untrustworthy because of 
their abstract work roles and tasks, their provision of services is challenged. It becomes difficult 
to provide services within the local health system if the motives behind these services are deemed 
invalid (cf. Gran 2002; Farris, Senner and Butterfield 1973). In the words of Nurse Jacob (18 
March 2015):  
 
[…] they [the hospital staff] said: ‘What are you actually doing here, because you’re supposed to 
support us, but how?’ […] It became really hard for us to work at that point. ‘We cannot give 
you anything, and we have come to support you’. It’s quite vague and it became kind of made-up. 
They wanted concrete things and not being able to give anything concrete made it much harder to 
work.  
 
Evidently, the issue of trust was not isolated to the relationship between the citizens, local 
authorities’ and healthcare workers. It also encompassed the relationship between the local co-
workers and the foreign aid workers. If the motives of the MSB delegates are deemed illegitimate 
thus leading to untrustworthiness, it impacts the local co-workers’ understanding of MSB as an 
organization. Eventually, it also affects the social system wherein the organization is included. In 
a similar vein, the perception of the social system can be seen as impacting the idea individuals 
may have of the organizations constituting it (cf. Gran 2002; Farris, Senner and Butterfield 1973). 
Thus, if people distrust the governments of these countries, and if they also are skeptical towards 
the motives of foreign aid workers, then distrust may trickle down to other entities they are 
associated with, such as MSB. Consequently, the MSB delegates entered an arena where they had 
to assert themselves and establish trust in lieu of the distrusted social system of both internal 
(Ministry of Health, the local government) and external (WHO, foreign aid workers etc.) actors 
they were associated with. This task proved difficult because of the perceived abstractness of the 
motives behind their task. Nevertheless, as outsiders, the MSB delegates could become trusted if 
they were regarded as insiders of the local health system. Thereby, their practices and perhaps 
even motives could find legitimacy in a communally shared understanding of this systems reality, 
i.e. the culture governing the local health system (cf. Tomlinson 1999:18-29). 
In sum, embarking on a global health intervention is entering a field of complexities where 
many obstacles lay in the way of such a mission, which was quite clearly depicted through these 
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interview encounters. The obstacles encountered by the MSB delegates did not differ much from 
those previously mentioned (see 2.3 Disease prevention challenges); however, two aspects were mainly 
stressed; trust and the relative normality of everyday life. It becomes clear that these aspects are 
interlinked with issues of risk, fear and corruption. Additionally, the aspect of information and its 
transferal both within and outside the region has a clear impact on both the external and internal 
perception of the situation. Certain reasoning is drawn from projected information that becomes 
the basis for preconceptions with regards to risk, fear and so on related to the Ebola ‘hot zone’. 
As portrayals of the situation come to be rumors or notions of ‘truths’ they spread throughout 
communities and have the power to establish distrust against certain actors. Distrust may become 
fortified if these actors’ affiliates are also distrusted, and so, just like an infection it spreads and 
occupies one cell at a time. For many of the MSB delegates this entailed a process of establishing 
trust by legitimizing the motives of their mission. At its core, this involved concretizing these 
motives and objectives so that they became visible actions. Through this process it was possible 
for the delegates to establish trust. By doing so, the preconception of their motives came to be 
falsified. Nonetheless, one interviewee stresses the importance of building trust by establishing a 
relationship over a longer period of time:  
 
I had been there for 3 months and they started calling me veteran, I had been there the longest. 
You should never go out on a mission to such a place if you cannot be there for at least 6 months 
up to 1 year because it takes such a long time to get the hang of it; it takes time to learn, find the 
right roads, get the right contacts, establish collaboration and trust amongst each other. This is 
built up during a longer period of time.  
- Fredrik, 7 April 2015 
 
Based on this, it is questionable if trust is possible to establish when the rotation of foreign aid 
workers seems so frequent. Although, some of the interviewees felt that they had successfully 
established trust by concretizing their motives through actions. Thus, perhaps the best practice 
for short-term missions is to avoid abstractness of objectives.  
Nevertheless, having one’s motives constantly questioned by others may lead to a 
questioning of ’Self’. Perhaps even more so when one’s perceptions of the context become 
falsified and one’s individual motives thereby come into question. Thus, obstacles encountered 
on the ground do not only limit the possibility of a health intervention, but they also impact the 
foreign aid workers understanding of ‘Self’ in their role. In the following section this is discussed 
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more in-depth in relation to the consolidation of objectives that occurs within the MSB delegates 
as well as in the organization they belong to.  
 
6.2 Consolidating objectives 
Initially, MSB had three main tasks, Gustav (27 March 2015) clarifies these as follows:  
 
[…] help build parts of the Ebola treatment units that were placed all around Monrovia. […] 
support other foreign medical teams that came and would work in these Ebola treatment units 
[…]. And as a third component in our mission […] to have medical service on standby for relief 
workers  
 
However, the circumstances in the Liberia were continuously changing with the fluctuation of 
detected Ebola cases. As the number of cases seemed to decrease in Liberia the question was if 
MSB’s initial medical mission should still focus on the WHO assigned tasks. Dr. Max (30 March 
2015), who was involved in the planning of MSB’s mission and conducted the first assessment in 
Liberia, shares his thoughts concerning this:  
 
Then we went home and […] the number of Ebola cases decreased tangibly rapid in Liberia. It 
was already noticeable when we were there. The decrease had begun, and it was a question of what 
this would entail. Despite this the UN, WHO requested that Swedish MSB contribute with a 
foreign medical team to run their own and support another Ebola treatment unit in Monrovia. 
Long before the request came, you could anticipate; ‘will this actually be needed?’ But that 
coordination is not held by MSB, rather you basically do as you are told or you say ‘we can do 
this, and we are prepared to take on this.’ 
… 
[Returning to Monrovia] We realized that we could not continue to recruit and to motivate [the 
need for] the huge amount of personnel that were requested for this task. We immediately realized, 
and offered to right away find other possibilities to work with, before people came down.  
 
These thoughts do not only highlight the flexibility required by MSB in this mission, they also 
illuminate the social system in which the organization comes to belong in as it embarks on this 
mission (cf. Granovetter 1985:487). As the WHO requests MSB’s involvement, MSB falls under 
the umbrella of the WHO. Subsequently, MSB becomes a cog in the WHO coordinated global 
health machinery, which is trying to prevent the global spread of Ebola. Dr. Max (30 March 
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2015) seems to concur with this argument, as he states: […] you have to take a step back and see 
yourself as a cog in a giant machinery. In applying the notions of transaction domain and domain 
consensus to this relationship (cf. Frödin 2008:69-70), it is presumable that MSB finds certain 
consensus with the WHO and their agenda regarding Ebola; otherwise they would not have 
taken on their request. By doing so, MSB comes to adjust the logic of action within their 
transaction domain to that of the machinery. Thus, the interacting actors share an understanding 
of which roles they have within this domain, i.e. which cog they are within this giant machinery. 
However, seeing oneself as a small entity of a greater whole could lead to alienation, as each actor 
is specialized in a certain part of the process and will therefore not be able to follow the process 
to the finishing line (cf. Lipsky 1980:77-78).  
In light of the transformative nature of the outbreak MSB’s mission in Liberia firstly 
expanded from Monrovia to the town of Greenville in Sione County, Liberia. In late December 
2014 it extended to Freetown, the capital of Sierra Leone (MSB 2015). As personnel arrived to 
Monrovia the assigned tasks were not as expected. When volunteering for MSB’s mission against 
Ebola, all interviewees asserted that this mission primarily focused on medical aspects, i.e. 
healthcare, medical knowledge, medical staff and so on. The mission had been declared to be 
primarily medical in nature; however, for many, the medical emphasis of the mission had in 
reality become over-shadowed by logistics. According to Dr. Ingrid (12 April 2015) it: felt like a 
building project with medical advisors and it should have been a medical project with non-medical helpers, advisors. 
Since the medical objectives of the mission were not experienced as the primary focus tension 
arose between the healthcare workers personal goals and the agencies objectives. MSB seemed to 
have retreated from their initial medical emphasis and perhaps this was due to the continuously 
transforming nature of the situation in Liberia. With a stance in Lipsky’s (1980:144-145) 
theoretical framework, it can be argued that the bureaucracy experienced difficulties in achieving 
its objectives and choose to adjust these to better fit their capabilities in a tumultuous context. 
And so, its shifted objectives came to be reflected in the tasks assigned to the health workers, as 
some of them felt that their medical skills were not utilized. Before entering the field their 
assignments lacked clarity in beforehand and did not require the competency they had.  
 
We were a bit redundant, and so we got to do chores that were not necessary, but were improving 
the situation.  […] We [the medical group] didn’t really have any roles, so we had to make them 
up. […] I’m a specialist with a double competency, and a doctor with double competency, we 
screwed together cabinets, which didn’t have anything to do with Ebola. So, it became a lot of these 
tasks that you don’t need high competency for.  
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- Nurse Jacob, 18 March 2015 
 
When I came in January and asked what I would do, I got the question: ‘Hasn’t anyone in 
Sweden recruited you and told you what you would do?’ I said: ‘No, they just told me that I would 
find out when I came’ 
- Dr. Ingrid, 12 April 2015 
 
Although the tasks at hand seemed unclear the healthcare workers believed that their competency 
would be utilized. Being recruited as medical personnel several of the interviewees experienced 
confusion in their actual work role or position in Liberia. While in Sierra Leone the situation was 
different, as Dr. August puts it: It felt so frustrating when we were there in Liberia and didn’t have any 
patients and the few patients that were there were taken care of by Cuban doctors and nurses. But here [in Sierra 
Leone] we got proper tasks. Hence, the perception these health workers had regarding the tasks they 
would embark on did not coincide with the actuality of the situation in Liberia. The medical 
mission was by some not experienced as an actual medical mission. For those who had been 
motivated by the mission’s medical focus, volunteered due to this and recruited on the basis of 
their medical competencies, the work in the field was not as anticipated. Dr. August stresses this 
clearly by pointing out that proper tasks involve taking care of patients and not doing these 
anticipated tasks led to frustration.  
Taking care of patients and providing health services to citizens is something these 
healthcare workers do in their everyday life in Sweden. Using Lipsky’s (1980:13-25) terminology, 
all but one of the interviewed health workers directly interact with patients in Sweden; therefore, 
they impact these lives through exercising discretionary judgments that determine their eligibility 
for health services. They are street-level bureaucrats that have the power to make policy as they 
are relatively independent from organizational authority and can quite freely make decisions in 
their provision of services. Thus, as these individuals choose to partake in MSB’s medical 
mission; recruited and employed as medical staff; they believed that their provision of health 
services, i.e. taking care of patients, would be the same in the field. This proved not to be the 
case.  
In contrast to the healthcare personnel deployed in Sierra Leone, those in Liberia felt a 
discrepancy between their role as street-level bureaucrats at home and the loss of this ‘Self’ in the 
field. Some feelings of frustration could be sensed during some of the interviews as these health 
workers competencies were not utilized. While some of the interviewees coped with this by 
making up tasks that would grant satisfaction, stories were told about co-workers who were not 
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able to adjust to the flexibility the situation required of them. It can be argued that these found it 
difficult to consolidate both their own motives for volunteering and perceptions of the objectives 
of their individual tasks with the work they had to perform in the field (cf. Lipsky 1980:144-145). 
For all the interviewees the main motive for participating in MSB’s mission stemmed from 
feelings of compassion and helpfulness. In general, it was believed that they could contribute 
with their competencies to ease the situation:  
 
I have been to West Africa before and thought that they needed help. I know the area and I can 
help.  
- Nurse Jacob, 18 March 2015 
 
I am used to working with no-touch policy, and this is something that would fit me. 
- Dr. Ingrid, 12 April 2015 
 
If we in the West don’t do anything, who is then going to do anything? We have the resources, and 
can send both people and equipment. So this was one of the reasons for why I signed up.  
- Nurse Karin, 26 March 2015  
 
Despite the fact that some interviewees felt that the assigned tasks did not require medical skills, 
job satisfaction could still be found. Presumably these other assignments were still in line with the 
individual motives that had pushed these actors to participate in the mission. Interpreting Lipsky 
(1980:144-145, 148), it can be argued that job satisfaction was found as the personal goals came 
to be modified to the situation and its required capacities. It is also imaginable that as some goals 
are competing with each other, the professional ideology, which in this case can be seen as taking 
care of patients, outweighed and guided goal orientation. Thus, the incompatibility of tasks with 
this ideology leads to job dissatisfaction. Nurse Jacob (198 March 2015) describes this internal 
tension between objectives and the search for motivation as follows:   
 
There were a lot of us that strongly considered resigning and going home because we were supposed 
to do one thing and now we just walked around there. […] You have to find something else, and 
there are often a lot of useful things you can do that are not as ‘fine’. It’s ‘fine’ to take care of a 
bunch of patients and its ‘fine’ to do an achievement you can put your name on, but there are a lot 
of things that have to function around this. […] I find it quite easy to do these things instead 
[…]. It has to be done. So this made it possible for me to stay: ‘Yes, I’m still doing something, 
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I’m not just sitting here and getting a paid vacation in Liberia’. […] So, it was to find something 
that made the day meaningful. 
- Nurse Jacob, 18 March 2015 
 
According to Lipsky (1980:142-149) it is at this crossroad the employee implements coping 
mechanisms to deal with the situation. As the quote illustrates, two possible coping mechanisms 
were considered when the objectives of the mission were not as anticipated; quitting or finding 
other tasks that would grant job satisfaction. Hence, contrary to the dissatisfaction and 
frustration experienced by some deployed in Liberia, the healthcare workers in Sierra Leone did 
not have to consolidate their objectives to find meaningfulness in their tasks. They had been 
assigned clear positions and tasks that required their medical skills. As they provided health 
services to citizens, had a high degree of discretion in decision-making and independence from 
authority in this work, they were so-called street-level bureaucrats in the field. Nevertheless, for 
those in Liberia who were not capable of consolidating objectives to find meaningfulness in their 
work, quitting perhaps seemed like the only option. They had anticipated that their role as street-
level bureaucrats would continue but in a different setting. Instead they lost the high degree of 
discretion and independence from authority they were used to, and perhaps expected in this 
context. As Dr. Ingrid (12 April 2015) puts it: …you get there and have to be extremely flexible and then I 
think you should have also trusted me to make my own decisions. Not being able to have decision-making 
power over one’s own work may lead to feelings of alienation, as highlighted by Lipsky (1980:75-
79). The feeling of alienation is perhaps one reason for why some of the Swedish healthcare 
workers stationed in Liberia choose to return home ahead of time. In becoming alienated they 
would not have been satisfied with their work, which impacted their commitment to both the 
patients and the agency they work for.  
These health workers were in a sense also deprived of the advocacy position that follows 
with the role as a street-level bureaucrat. In other words, how can you be an advocate if you are 
not interacting with those you are advocating for? How will you know what services are the most 
suitable for your clients if you have not even met them? Working with assignments that do not 
require specialization, such as screwing together cabinets, means that this work position cannot 
be used to secure services for clients. Advocacy becomes less possible if this position does not 
even involve direct provision and interaction with these clients. However, as stressed by Lipsky 
(1980:72-74), advocacy is also dependent on the organization wherein this is enacted. The 
bureaucracy may impede measures for advocacy by tightly controlling or hoarding resources, 
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while the advocate seeks to disperse these. One interviewee describes an experience regarding 
this:  
  
The absolute greatest challenge was to formulate oneself in such a way that what you were doing 
could be seen from an Ebola perspective. […] It was a big issue that we could not gain hearing for 
simpler things, rather it was more ‘we are going to build a bench here were we are going to sit to 
take the temperature of people suspected for Ebola.’ So it was a great challenge to see the needs 
and know that the resources were there and you were just allowed to do things that were [directly] 
related to Ebola. But we were good at reformulating so that we still succeed. […] It was such a 
slow and stiff decision path; instead of saying ‘now we have combated Ebola and we have people 
and resources in place, can we not take 5 million to do something that is not directly Ebola 
related, but indirectly’; a discussion regarding that was not even possible to have. […] and I 
thought that it was an absolute waste of resources that we were sitting there. 
- Dr. Ingrid, 12 April 2015 
 
This statement clearly highlights the measures taken to control the organizations resources, both 
in regards to human and fiscal capital. It also shows how the interviewee tries to frame resource 
dispersal within the so-called Ebola perspective held by the agency. Thus, advocacy is gained 
through portraying resource dispersal as something of interest for the organization, which seems 
to be done through modifying the goals for spending resources based on the goals of the agency. 
Dr. Ingrid’s account also indicates the resistance that exists to efforts that reduce discrepancy, 
such as constrains in resources (cf. Lipsky 1980:72-74). As seen in the personal motives that 
guided some of the interviewees to partake in MSB’s mission, the human aspect of street-level 
work and the hope to improve the lives of others was central, and is according to Lipsky 
(1980:105) the basis for job satisfaction for street-level bureaucrats. To attain this personal 
motive entails resisting resource constrains that may limit discretion, which permits these 
healthcare workers to have this influence (cf. Ibid: 105-106).      
Something that was not only pinpointed in this previous quote, but also by other 
interviewees was the stiff and slow character of the agency and the global health machinery it was 
a part of. As portrayed by some of the interviewees, it could be understood as an ideal Weberian 
bureaucracy that is strictly following routines, standards and protocols (Weber 1968:956-958). It 
could be argued that this can be understood as an obstacle not only when exercising advocacy 
but also in responding to local circumstances. Mandatory procedures reduce the possibilities for 
discretion as the healthcare worker’s freedom in decision-making becomes restrained by the 
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rigidity of bureaucratic structure. These structures limit the healthcare worker in such a way that 
s/he becomes unable to adhere to the interests of the patient; thereby, transforming this patient 
into a bureaucratic case number (cf. Lipsky 1980:40, 105-106). However, everyone did not get the 
opportunity to act as street-level bureaucrats out in the field. As touched upon, the rigid 
bureaucratic nature of the global health machinery encompassing MSB, required continuous 
adherence to bureaucratic structures, which Dr. Ingrid (12 April 2015) argues resulted in a slow 
information flow internally in the organization:  
 
[…] everything [of the situation in the Liberia] is supposed to be reported in quite a stiff way. 
[…] If you would have had a direct report then you wouldn’t have come there as a doctor and 
become surprised that there were no Ebola patients to take care of and you did other things 
instead. […] I would say that the reporting lead to a slow information transfer.  
 
Consequently, the slow information transfer within the organization lead to the spread of a 
false image of the capacities that the situation required. Thus, as these healthcare workers entered 
the field they lacked purpose as their intentions for embarking on this mission did not coincide 
with the situation’s requirements. The bureaucratic structures that were intended to facilitate the 
organizational information flow came to become barriers to these flows (cf. Ritzer 2011:2). Thus, 
the local circumstances were not adhered to as the bureaucracy was unable to see beyond these 
mandatory procedures. This inflexibility of the bureaucracy becomes particularly problematic as 
the bureaucracy moves across nations were these procedures and protocols do not always work. 
A constantly changing situation requires responsiveness and flexibility, which a stiff bureaucratic 
structure may be incapable of. Hence, to be tied up by mandatory procedures may lead to the 
incapability of adjusting to the local circumstances (cf. Lipsky 1980:105-106). Moreover, by 
adhering to routines and procedures the bureaucracy tries to be efficient; however, these same 
routines and procedures can lead to inefficiency. In the following section, the negotiation of 
culture that occurs when bureaucracies and bureaucrats move across borders is discussed more 
in-depth.       
 
6.3 Negotiating culture 
 
It is this country [Liberia] that is in lead and they are the ones accountable to its population and 
so on. So when the humanitarian circus comes it’s a bit like a self-playing amusement park; we 
have our way of doing things and it’s damn tough if the one we are helping says ‘no, don’t help me 
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like that, help me like this instead’. So, even though we certainly want them to manage on their 
own, we want them to manage on their own in our way.  
- Gustav, 27 March 2015 
 
This quote emphasizes one of the main topics concerning culture that was brought up by the 
interviewees. Culture is an important aspect of humanitarian missions, such as the one embarked 
on by MSB in West Africa. As argued in this statement, these global health interventions involve 
a whole set of performances, just like a circus, that play their predetermined act in the field. Each 
actor has its own set of acts that are included in their performance. In other words, MSB and 
every other agency/actor have their particular role in combating Ebola. As an actor partaking in 
this grand performance, i.e. combating Ebola, MSB becomes a part of this ‘circus’, which has the 
WHO as its ‘circus manager’. When these actors enter the field to conduct their particular act it 
can be difficult to step outside this performance. The show must go on although this perhaps 
results in a clash between the audience’s preferences and the content of the performance. 
Likewise, the eagerness of wanting the receivers to internalize the circus’ way of doing things also 
leads to a clash, as one way of performing is seen to be better than another; thus, creating a 
dichotomy between ‘us’ and ‘them’. ‘We’ do it in one way, whilst ‘they’ do it in another way; yet, 
‘we’ want them to do it in our way. However, to mediate the understanding that different logics 
of action are context dependent can be problematic (cf. Frödin 2013:72-73), which the following 
statement stresses: 
 
The greatest challenge was perhaps introducing newly arrived Swedes to ‘we are not here to take 
over and run anything.’ […] It was a question of standing behind the Liberians without being 
noticed, so to speak. It’s quite easy that you take over when you believe that you’re an expert. In 
this context we weren’t experts. For one thing, we’re entering a medical system that is different to 
ours. This is about routines, both in regards to treatment, giving medication and different types of 
medication and you have other ways of documenting etc. We were not supposed to change these 
things; rather we were supposed to continue using them. We were not supposed to come in with our 
Swedish medical bag and go straight in and say: ‘here we provide regular Swedish medicine’, 
absolutely not! And I believe that some had a difficulty buying or comprehending that this was the 
case.  
- Dr. Max, 30 March 2015 
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Conveying the idea that the MSB delegates were not there to ‘take over’ did not seem to get 
through. As mentioned in the previous section (see 5.2 Conveying objectives) several of the 
healthcare personnel believed that their tasks would involve taking care of patients; however, as 
this quote indicates the main task was to support the Liberian personnel in their work. It seems 
as if this objective did not come across very clearly and as this information was re-conveyed in 
the field many seemed to not comprehend this. According to the aforementioned statement, 
some of the delegates thought that they were supposed to work as they usually did at home 
despite the fact that the context where the work would be performed had changed. Hence, as the 
context changes the manner in which work is performed also changes. In other words, the local 
health setting, as a particular transaction domain, had its own logic of action that differed from 
the context the Swedish healthcare workers were used to (cf. Frödin 2013:72-73). This was visible 
culturally, as there seemed to be a difference in the work routines employed by the local medical 
staff (cf. Tomlinson 1999:18-20). This created a situation where the Swedish healthcare workers 
had to adapt their work methods to those used within the new context that they were trying to 
work within. As Dr. Max previously emphasized, one cannot solely enter a new field and expect 
to be an expert in how things work there. Although, healthcare as a particular transaction domain 
may seem similar all over the globe in regards to roles invoked in this sphere, that is, a doctor is 
always a doctor regardless of where you are, the actual deontic power this role is associated with 
or the routines that govern this actors’ behavior may differ depending on the context (cf. Frödin 
2013:72-73). Thus, the way of performing healthcare becomes locally anchored. In short, health 
services become ‘glocalized’ and thereby adjusted to the context wherein it is performed (cf. 
Ritzer 2011:159). For the local health workers in Sierra Leone some of the prerequisites for 
healthcare were the shortage of resources in regards to medial staff and equipment. Subsequently, 
it was not possible to enter this new transaction domain of healthcare and assume that everything 
would be the same as in Sweden. Inventiveness and ingenuity seemed to be the catchword 
emphasized by some of the interviewees. Nurse Karin (26 March 2015) highlights this in the 
following way: 
 
We worked with the Sierra Leonean team and there were nurses we simply had to teach [some 
had just passed their examination, others weren’t fully trained]. Then there was a lack of things 
[…]. We didn’t have enough needles, pharmaceuticals and so you had to be very inventive.  […] 
None of those things you take for granted here [in Sweden] were there. Rather it was kind of old 
fashioned; you measured heart rate with your fingers, you counted breaths and so on.  
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To be able to adjust to the prerequisites of the situation by being inventive was required by these 
healthcare workers. However, to adjust to the new context and internalize the logic of action 
governing a healthcare setting requires an acknowledgement of these practices. By understanding 
this particular context as a transaction domain, it can be argued that to acknowledge its guiding 
logics of action, rules and routines of the domain become legitimate ways of interacting. As 
actors adjust to the culture existing within this domain their acknowledgement of its logics of 
action may become visible as they agree with the routines and practices employed in this sphere 
(cf. Frödin 2013:72-73). When these actors internalize this new culture, the shared understanding 
of its logic of action becomes portrayed in their beliefs and practices. It is through these logics of 
action that they come to make sense of the reality in this sphere (cf. Tomlinson 1999:18-20). 
However, this can be quite a difficult task in itself. Fredrik (7 April 2015), team leader logistics, 
brings forth this dilemma of consolidating different logics of action as he depicts the interaction 
between cultures in the work place:  
 
You have a different work culture there and a different temperature to work in; it’s a different 
environment to work in. They perhaps don’t have same way of working that we might have wished 
for or are used to. But you can neither introduce our way of working or our culture; rather we had 
to adjust to them. But we still felt we wanted results and you had to push for that.  
… 
[…] we went in for it and did what we could to get good work performance and motivation of the 
staff. They got their equipment, they got their cloths and they got their means of assistance. But 
then it kind of was like they didn’t use it in the way you had expected when they got it. And it 
was perhaps that they weren’t used to it.  
 
Fredrik goes on to further say: 
 
[…] in the way they are working here [in Liberia], everyone thought that everything was working 
perfectly. […] it was a total culture collision with how we work.  
 
As illustrated by this account, there seemed to be a negotiation between the MSB delegates’ 
understanding of the logics of action within this new domain and the logics of action they bring 
with them to this context. Based on the presented statements, there appears to be a perception of 
a wrong versus a right way of performing work, in which the understanding conveyed about this 
dichotomy appears to be that the local co-workers wrongfully believe that their way of working is 
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perfect. Thus, it seems as if so-called ‘good work performance’ is defined differently by the local 
contra the foreign actors. Moreover, the means to instigate such performance amongst the staff 
also appear to differ. From the perspective of the interviewee, motivation and good work 
performance appear to be instigated by rewards, such as equipment and cloths, which are 
believed to push the worker to perform wanted results and objectives. Presumably, this 
perception is derived from a cultural idea based on a shared communal understanding that such 
rewards drive the worker to achieve ‘good work performance’ (cf. Tomlinson 1999:18-20). 
However, this shared communal understanding of practices within the workplace that may 
function as a logic of action in a Swedish context does not seem to work in this particular sphere. 
Thus, it can be argued that the logic of action in one context is not always transferable to 
another. Not acknowledging the logic of action in the local healthcare setting may make it 
difficult for the foreign healthcare workers to mediate Ebola prevention measures in this setting. 
They would lack understanding of the communal idea of reality that would explain practices and 
beliefs in this domain. Thus, a border is created between these different communal ideas of 
reality within the healthcare setting; thereby, creating a dichotomy between the local health 
domain and the foreign health domain. Ultimately, these foreign health workers would be 
excluded from the local health domain in which they are trying to mediate global health policies.   
Nevertheless, by acknowledging the local healthcare settings logic of action and also 
adjusting to it is perhaps possible if the foreign healthcare worker merges or consolidates their 
own logic of action with the local logic of action ruling this setting. Through such an internal 
process, a hybrid or a fused transaction domain may emerge if local and foreign actors 
collectively agree and define this situation as a particular transaction domain with its specific roles 
and logic of action. Nevertheless, to impose a different logic of action in a transaction domain, 
which has not gained consensus by the actors embedded in this domain, would entail a difficulty 
in interaction. The idea is that if an actor engaging in a transaction domain is familiar with its 
governing logics of action, this individual will have the tools to navigate in this sphere. Moreover, 
the actor gains a certain role as a member of this domain, which inherently entails certain deontic 
power. Deontic power not only involves the obligations associated with this role it also comes 
with certain possibilities to exert power (cf. Frödin 2008:69-70; 2013:72-73). This is something 
Dr. Max (30 March 2015) previously pointed out when stating: […] It’s quite easy that you take over 
when you believe that you’re an expert. In this context we weren’t experts. Hence, having the role as an 
‘expert’ in a particular domain gives certain deontic power, which may make it possible for an 
actor to ‘take over’ certain parts of the work. For the health worker, expertise involves the 
specialization in one area of the provision of health services to patients. By being specialized in 
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an area, healthcare workers’ become more independent from organizational authority when 
making discretionary judgements. The organizational authorities lack the specialist knowledge 
these healthcare workers have and will therefore give these experts free hands in making 
decisions within their area of expertise (cf. Lipsky 1980:146-147).  
Nonetheless, as previously indicated, in the context of Sierra Leone and Liberia these MSB 
delegates were not experts in the code of conduct for the transaction domain they entered. Thus, 
despite their occupational expertise, the medical system that they had entered differed in regards 
to its logic of action. As they were not part of this local system their occupational expertise, 
which had granted them certain empowerment at home, did not automatically grant them a 
similar status in the field until they would be acknowledged by this new system as experts. Dr. 
August (14 April 2015) depicts the experience of becoming included in this new system and 
gaining so-called deontic power through the role as a doctor: 
 
[…] you could say that this doctor [in Sierra Leone] gave us free hands. […] the things we got to 
do felt really meaningful and we started organizing and initiated a medical record, medicine lists 
and also decided on some medication schedules and what types of medicine they would have during 
different phases of the disease and so on.  
 
As illuminated by this quote, the role assigned to Dr. August involved freedom to take 
discretionary judgements in certain areas of the work. Thus, this particular role came to be 
associated with specific deontic power. The interviewed Swedish healthcare worker had become a 
part of the local healthcare setting, i.e. the Sierra Leonean health domain. Moreover, it is 
interesting to note that for Dr. August to become a part of the local setting, this position was 
granted by the local doctor. In other words, Dr. August was forwarded trust and legitimacy by 
someone who was trusted and who had knowledge of the local context. Thus, through this 
position, access to the local healthcare setting was granted (cf. Frödin 2013:72-73; Gran 2002; 
Farris, Senner and Butterfield 1973).  
As briefly argued in the previous section of this analysis (see 5.2 Consolidating objectives) the 
interviewed healthcare workers that were in Sierra Leone had found that their role as street-level 
workers was similar in the field. Hence, they had moved across cultures while keeping this 
position, and so they had become ‘global’ street-level workers. Although the logic of action in 
this particular healthcare setting differed, the particular role they were assigned was associated 
with the similar deontic power as they were used to, which may have made it simpler to adjust to 
the unfamiliar context. Moreover, in this particular time and space the local healthcare was 
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working to combat Ebola and these external street-level bureaucrats had come to do the same. 
As these Swedish healthcare workers were assigned roles within the Sierra Leonean healthcare 
setting to do so, their personal goals with the mission came to be satisfied. Thus, it may have 
become easier to consolidate their inherent logic of action with the local domain’s logic of action, 
as both the external and the local health workers shared the same objective; combating Ebola. 
In the subsequent chapter, a concluding discussion is presented that provides a summary of 
the analysis and a final discussion concerning these findings. It briefly concludes the implication 
of these and suggests a path to further research.  
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7 Concluding discussion 
While navigating the field the interviewed MSB delegates came across similar obstacles to those 
mentioned in the background chapter of this thesis. Nevertheless, two aspects were mainly 
emphasized; trust and the relative normality of everyday life. These aspects had clear links with 
how risk, fear and corruption were perceived both by the delegates themselves and by the people 
they came across in the field. Information transferred of the field, via international media, had 
limited liquidity since mainly the horror caused by the disease ‘went viral’. The situation was 
portrayed selectively, as risk and fear formed barriers to the flow of information from the 
confines of the ‘hot zone’. Based on this information transferal, the interviewed MSB delegates 
created a perception of how the EVD epidemic had impacted societal life in these countries, 
which did not coincide with the reality they experienced on the ground. Thus, some of the 
delegates were surprised that everyday life was relatively normal, although with one main 
exception. The Ebola virus prevention measures had forced societal changes, which resulted in 
the transformation of cultural practices. As the everyday reality of the local population had 
changed due to this deadly disease, it induced an altered collective understanding of this new 
reality. This came to be visible in peoples’ beliefs and practices, such as the lack of close human 
contact (cf. Tomlinson 1999:18-20). Besides navigating in the field, the MSB delegates, as foreign 
actors, had to establish trust to facilitate the execution of their tasks. As pointed out by Arrow 
(1974:23) “[t]rust is an important lubricant of a social system” and so without trust, the system 
wherein you are trying to act, works against you. Specifically, for the MSB delegates this involved 
the local co-workers questioning their motives for being in the region. In general, rumors spread 
throughout these countries that questioned the motives for why the westerners were there. 
However, by legitimizing the motives of their mission the MSB delegates could establish trust. 
Basically, this involved the concretization of their motives and objectives so that the intentions of 
these became visible through actions.  
Establishing trust involves a process of concretizing objectives by being transparent. 
However, being distrusted and continuously questioned by others may lead to a questioning of 
‘Self’, as it may put into question ones motives for partaking in the mission. Perhaps even more 
so when the context does not fulfil the perceptions one had of it. For the healthcare workers in 
particular, the perceptions of MSB’s medical mission did not concur with the tasks some of them 
were assigned. While the healthcare workers in Sierra Leone were taking care of patients; thereby, 
performing street-level work in direct interaction with citizens; some of the interviewed health 
workers in Liberia were assigned tasks or had to make up tasks that did not require their 
occupational expertise. In Sierra Leone job satisfaction was attained as personal goals; helping 
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others and being of use; were gratified. These actors had become ‘global’ street-level bureaucrats 
as they attained the status as heath workers and came to be embedded in the local health domain. 
In Liberia, dissatisfaction and frustration arose amongst the medical staff who had not been 
assigned street-level work and were unable to make up tasks. They lacked the deontic power, i.e. 
the high degree of discretion and autonomy in decision-making, which they were used to as 
street-level bureaucrats (cf. Frödin 2013:72-73; Lipsky 1980:13-25). Some came to be alienated 
due to the loss of decision-making power over their work (Lipsky 1980:75). Moreover, in this 
new field, these health workers lacked direction, as their work role lacked clarity. If they were not 
street-level workers on a medical mission, what role did they have? Those experiencing a loss of 
occupational ‘Self’ resorted to two different coping mechanisms; quitting or consolidating 
objectives. By making up tasks that corresponded to their personal motives, goals and perhaps 
even professional ideology (taking care of patients), some found meaningfulness and job 
satisfaction (cf. Lipsky 1980:148). Hence, as the situation changed they adjusted to it and bridged 
the discrepancy between the objectives of the tasks in the field and their personal goals.  
Although it could be assumed that the domain of health is similar everywhere, the merge 
between global and local notions of health create glocalized health settings, i.e. geographically 
distinct health domains (cf. Ritzer 2011:159). For those healthcare workers who stayed in Liberia, 
it therefore became important to covey the idea that they were not there to ‘take over’; rather 
they had to adjust to the logic of action within the local healthcare setting. They had to become a 
part of the local health domain, just as the Swedish healthcare workers in Sierra Leone. For the 
Swedish health workers with clear roles as street-level bureaucrats this seemed like a simpler task, 
as they became assigned roles within this pre-existing domain. However, for the healthcare 
workers who had to make up their own tasks this was a more difficult mission. As they were not 
assigned the position of street-level worker in this new field, these health workers had to establish 
a role that would fit in this domain. By making up tasks that fulfilled the objective of the domain, 
i.e. combating Ebola, a role in the local health system could be attained. However, this required 
knowledge of the logic of action within the local health domain to understand the specific roles 
assigned within it. In doing so, these health workers could find and fill a gap within this pre-
existing system. To be able to act within this local domain they had to acknowledge the logic of 
action within that space, which could occur due to the shared objective to prevent the ebolavirus.    
In conclusion, this study has aimed to investigate the extent to which Swedish healthcare 
workers, when combating the ebolavirus in West Africa, take into consideration the local context 
in their application of global health preventive measures. The MSB delegates’ experiences of 
navigating global health interventions towards Ebola in the current ‘hot zone’ of West Africa illuminate the 
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complexities of embarking on such interventions. The local context continuously impacts the 
form of intervention that becomes possible. Not only does the situation require constant 
flexibility of the global health machinery and its employees, it also requires adjustment to the 
challenges, such as distrust, corruption and the lack of resources, which can impede the provision 
of healthcare. Basically, the Ebola prevention mission has to become glocalized. However, this is 
a problematic venture when the bureaucracy and its employees are a part of a giant machinery. As 
noted in the analysis, MSB fell under the umbrella of the global health machinery when working 
to combat Ebola. The agency became accountable to the machinery that it was embedded in and 
the objectives it set. To stray away from these objectives meant that the assigned task would not 
have been accomplished. However, due to the rapid decrease of cases in Liberia, MSB’s mission 
came to focus less on medicine, which signified an attempt to adjust the mission to the changing 
needs of the local context. Then again, a total glocalization of the mission would perhaps entail 
an abandoning of the agency’s assigned role within the global health machinery. Thus, the main 
issue of inflexibility seemed to derive from bureaucratic stiffness caused by a strict adherence to 
mandatory protocols and objectives. These bureaucratic structures also limited the information 
transferal within the global health machinery, as reports from the field slowly made its way 
through the organization. Consequently, the global health machinery could not rapidly, efficiently 
and flexibly adjust and respond to the continuous changes in the local circumstances. The 
machinery had lost connection between its cogs. As information became more solidified it slowly 
flowed through the barriers of the system, which resulted in false perceptions of the field, 
misleading information becoming the basis for potential objectives and slow adjustment to the 
transforming circumstances. Subsequently, this nexus of complication could have been avoided if 
information from the field had flown more freely.  
Although the MSB delegates were a part of a larger system, their experiences indicate that 
they had a possibility to adjust their individual tasks to the local circumstances by making up 
assignments or by being inventive when resources were lacking. However, just as for the agency, 
this was only possible as long as these adjustments concurred with the main objectives of the 
mission. In those instances where the individual MSB delegate’s personal goals collided with the 
objectives and tasks of the mission or when their inherent logic of action did not concur with 
local ones, the actors came to negotiate their role in this system. Particularly, for the healthcare 
workers this involved an internal negotiation of their role in this culturally different context. Their 
experiences revealed that these actors’ had a continuous internal negotiation of ‘Self’ in relation 
to the ‘Other’ and the bureaucracy that they worked for, while trying to navigate health 
interventions in a foreign context. On the one hand, the ‘Other’ came to be the local culture 
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personified in co-workers and local communities, which had different medical practices. On the 
other hand, the ‘Other’ was the opposite of their occupational ‘Self’, i.e. the role of the non-
street-level worker assigned to some of these healthcare workers. Subsequently, there was a 
conflict between whom the ‘Self’ was at home and who the ‘Self’ was in this new context. By 
negotiating ‘Self’ in relation to ‘Other’ these health workers either established a new role within 
the existing health domain or were included in it as street-level bureaucrats. Hence, by 
consolidating the discrepancy between ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ they found their role within this 
culturally different context.  
The main implication of these findings seems to be the loss of the ‘bottom-up’ aspect in 
the application of global health policies, which occurs when the street-level bureaucrat’s high 
degree of discretion and relative independence from organizational authorities is weakened or 
even lost. As this take place, the street-level workers ability to adjust their provision of services to 
the local circumstances is limited. Consequently, policy is no longer made on the ground; rather it 
trickles down from above. Thereby, the street-level bureaucrats become the alienated bureaucrats 
that are merely cogs within the global health machinery. Furthermore, considering the ‘bottom-
up’ aspect of global health policy implementation, culture is an essential concept. Despite being 
an ambiguous and vague concept the negotiation of culture is an important component to policy 
implementing in different context. The ‘one size fits all’ approach and mindset (re-)produces a 
dichotomy between ‘us’ and ‘them’ where a certain way of doing things is seen as predominant. 
Although this issue has been touch in this thesis, to further engage in a discussion regarding this 
process of ‘Othering’, which creates dichotomizing borders between cultures, would have 
perhaps been an additional analytical aspect of interest. As this perspective perhaps could have 
revealed other mechanisms that enable and disable cultural negotiation and consolidation. Thus, 
on a final note, it would be interesting to engage in further research into what impact the 
‘Othering’ process could have on the ‘bottom-up’ implementation of global health policies.   
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Appendix I - List of interviewees  
 
Nurse Jacob, 18 March 2015 
Nurse Karin, 26 March 2015 
Gustav, Security advisor for humanitarian emergency response, 27 March 2015 
Dr. Max, 30 March 2015 
Fredrik, team leader logistics, 7 April 2015 
Dr. Ingrid, 12 April 2015  
Dr. August, 14 April 2015 
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Appendix II – Interview guide 
 
Bakgrund – Background  
- Kan du berätta lite om dig själv? 
Can you please tell me a little bit more about yourself?  
 
- Kan du berätta lite om det arbete du utför här hemma?  
Can you please tell me about the work you conduct here in Sweden?  
 
- Varför bestämde du dig för att åka till Västafrika?  
Why did you decide to travel to West Africa? 
 
- Hur kommer det sig att du valde att åka med MSB till Västafrika?  
Why did you choose to travel with MSB to West Africa? 
 
- På vilket sätt förberedde du dig inför resan?  
In what way did you prepare for this trip? 
 
Kontext – Context  
- Vilket land(länder) i Västafrika arbetade du i?  
In what West African country(-ies) did you work in?  
 
- När var du där senast och hur länge var du i regionen? 
When was the last time you were there, and for how long were you in the region?  
 
- Kan du berätta om det arbete du utförde?  
Can you please tell me about the work you conducted? 
 
- Kan du beskriva hur situationen såg ut i landet när du var där?  
Can you describe what the situation in the country was when you were there? 
 
- Vad var dina upplevelser av din första kontakt med epidemin?  
What were your experiences of your fist contact with the epidemic? 
 
- Hur kunde en dag ute på fältet se ut? 
How was a day out in the field? 
 
Kultur och relationen med befolkningen – Culture and relations with the population 
- Vad var din förståelse av den lokala kulturen innan du åkte? Stämde denna bild överrens 
med den verklighet du upplevde på plats?  
What was your understanding of the local culture before your trip? Did this picture concur with the reality 
you experienced on the ground? 
 
- Hur såg din relation ut med den lokala befolkningen?  
What was your relationship with the local population? 
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- Hur upplevde du att den lokala befolkningen bemötte dig/er?  
How did you experience that the local populations treated you/You?  
 
- Upplevde du att befolkningen hade förståelse för varför ni var där? På vilket sätt 
märktes/märktes inte detta? 
Did you experience that the local population understood why you were there? In what way was this 
noticeable/not noticeable? 
 
- Vilken information om sjukdomen förmedlade ni/du till befolkningen? Hur upplevde du 
att sjukdomen förstods av befolkningen?  
What kind of information about the disease did you/You pass on to the population? How did you 
experience the populations understanding of the disease?  
 
- På vilket sätt upplevde du att den lokala befolkningen tog åt sig den informationen om 
Ebola ni förmedlade?  
How did you experience that the local population internalized the information on Ebola that you passed 
on? 
 
- Hur upplevde du befolkningens relation till det befintliga hälsosystemet och regeringen? 
Påverkade denna situation, befolkningens relation till er?  
How did you experience the populations’ relationship to the existing health system and government? Did 
this situation impact the populations’ relationship to you? 
 
Implementering – Implementation  
- Vilka preventiva åtgärder arbetade du specifikt med?  
What preventive measures did you work with specifically?  
 
- Vilka var de lokala förutsättningarna för att implementera åtgärderna?  
What were the local prerequisites for implementing these measures? 
 
- Hade du möjlighet att anpassa åtgärderna utifrån de lokala förutsättningarna? (Skulle du 
kunna ge ett exempel på en situation där du anpassade åtgärder utifrån de lokala 
förutsättningarna och förklara varför du fattade detta beslut?) 
Did you have the opportunity to adjust these measures to these local prerequisites? (Could you give an 
example of a situation where you did this and explain why you made that decision?) 
 
- Vilken form av inflytande hade MSB över sättet du implementerade de preventiva 
åtgärderna ute i fältet?  
What kind of influence did MSB have over the way you implemented the preventive measures out in the 
field?  
 
- Upplevde du att det fanns svårigheter med att arbeta med och implementera de 
preventiva åtgärderna?  
Did you experience difficulties with working with and implementing the preventive measures?  
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Avslut – Closing questions 
- Vad var det mest givande med arbetet? 
What was the most rewarding part of your work?  
 
- Nu i efterhand, upplever du att något hade kunnat förbättras? 
Looking back, do you feel that something could have been improved?  
 
- Har du något du vill tillägga?  
Do you have anything you would like to add?  
 
 
 
  
